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The slow advancement of the multilateral trading system has led 
to a wave of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) in Latin America 
and the Caribbean resulting in a web of bilateral and plurilateral 
PTAs, with countries both within and outside the region. More than 40 
trade agreements now exist in the hemisphere, in addition to other 
arrangements that are now being negotiated or that will be negotiated 
before 2006. These agreements and their negotiation processes have 
generated centripetal and centrifugal forces that tend to unify and 
divide the regional integration process. While these agreements 
emerge as an opportunity for signatory countries, they also generate 
concerns in relation to such aspects as their consistency with 
multilateral commitments and the broadening and deepening of trade 
rules and disciplines beyond those being assumed in WTO. The 
disciplines contemplated in the areas of interest to industrialized 
countries tend to be “WTO-plus”, while the issues that affect Latin 
American and Caribbean signatories are often remitted to the 
multilateral negotiating forum. Hence, the multilateral level of 
negotiations cannot be simply replaced by a mix of bilateral and 
plurilateral negotiations. There is a call for a strong, complementary, 
mutually reinforcing process among the three (lateral, regional and 
multilateral) routes to liberalization and regulation. Bilateral 
agreements between countries or sub-regions could serve as “building 
blocks” when and if the precedents they establish are consistent with a 
comprehensive, balanced WTO that takes due account of the smaller 
economies’ vulnerabilities. This is also true in cases where the 
commitments made in certain disciplines included in bilateral and sub-
regional agreements facilitate the adoption of multilateral rules in the 
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same disciplines. Otherwise, bilateral agreements could impede the construction of a development-
oriented WTO, leaving the region with too extensive a web of hub-and-spoke agreements, with 
high associated costs of administration, transparency and efficiency. 
 
 




Recent experience in Latin America and the Caribbean shows 
that the growth of exports in goods and services is a necessary, albeit 
insufficient, condition for promoting economic growth with social 
equity (ECLAC 2002, 2001). Despite some success in diversifying 
trade by products and markets, the region’s export competitiveness is 
still mostly based on price differentials rooted in static comparative 
advantages, with low value added and little technological or 
knowledge content. 
Moreover, the foreign sector of the region has continued to be 
characterized by the vulnerability that arises from volatile capital 
markets, contracting demand in industrial countries and fluctuating 
commodity prices. This vulnerability has left Governments with a 
reduced capacity to introduce effective countercyclical policies and 
with huge balance-of-payments problems that ultimately compress 
imports and intraregional trade.  
In the light of these circumstances, the Latin American and 
Caribbean region’s trade agenda should not only be oriented towards 
enhanced market access to developed countries but should also focus 
on the supply-side constraints that impede diversification into, and the 
competitiveness of, technology-intensive goods and services sectors. 
This two-pronged approach, also consistent with the Doha 
Development Agenda, should in turn result in a multilateral and 
regional trading system that is more supportive of sustainable 
development, high-quality job creation and poverty reduction, while 
allowing the Latin American and Caribbean countries to manage 
policy and to build capable trade-related institutions. 
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The slow progress of the multilateral trading system has led to a wave of preferential trade 
agreements (PTAs) worldwide. The region continues to negotiate a web of bilateral and plurilateral 
PTAs, including the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA),1 with countries both within and 
outside the region. More than 40 trade agreements now exist in the hemisphere, in addition to other 
arrangements that are now being negotiated or that will be negotiated before 2006.2 These 
agreements and their negotiation processes have generated centripetal and centrifugal forces that 
tend to unify and divide the regional integration process. 
These agreements emerge as an opportunity for signatory countries, but they also generate 
concerns in relation to such aspects as their consistency with multilateral commitments and the 
broadening and deepening of free trade agreement (FTA) concessions beyond those being assumed 
in WTO (i.e., WTO-plus disciplines). The disciplines contemplated in the areas of interest to 
industrialized countries tend to be “WTO-plus”, while the issues that affect Latin American and 
Caribbean signatories are often remitted to the multilateral negotiating forum. Hence, the 
multilateral level of negotiations cannot be simply replaced by a mix of bilateral and plurilateral 
negotiations. There is a call for a strong, complementary, mutually reinforcing process among the 
three (lateral, regional and multilateral) routes to liberalization and regulation.  
In order for these sub-regional, plurilateral and hemispheric agreements to become more 
compatible with the multilateral trading system, the multilateral system itself should become more 
supportive of development, taking into account structural and emerging asymmetries between 
developed and developing countries and among the latter countries as well. The rules should fully 
accommodate the "developmental, financial and trade needs" of developing countries and provide 
them with sufficient policy scope (UNCTAD 2003b, p.19). At the same time, the countries of the 
region should maintain a certain margin of flexibility within the WTO, sub-regional and FTAA 
disciplines to adopt active policies for productive development in order to increase their systemic 
competitiveness. 
Open-trade policies can foster growth through greater productivity in investment and import 
competition, which can lead to a better allocation of resources and greater foreign investment flows 
aimed at capitalizing upon new trade opportunities. Nevertheless, it has to be complemented not 
only with better institutional environments and macroeconomic policies but also with public 
policies oriented towards a deep form of productive development (ECLAC 2004a). This is the 






                                                     
1 With a population of 800 million people and a GDP of almost $ 11 trillion dollars, FTAA is one of the most ambitious projects ever 
proposed by the Latin American and Caribbean countries (excepting Cuba), along with Canada and the United States. If it is 
created, it will become the world’s largest free trade area. 
2 This number does not include non-reciprocal trade agreements, of which there are five in the Americas: the Caribbean Basin 
Initiative, the Andean Trade Preferences Act, CARIBCAN and the agreements between CARICOM and Venezuela and CARICOM 
and Colombia. The “partial scope” agreements negotiated under the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI) are not 
included either. 
3 Ten years ago, ECLAC first introduced the concept of open regionalism as an effective “process of growing economic 
interdependence at the regional level, promoted both by preferential integration agreements and by other policies in a context of 
liberalization and deregulation, geared towards enhancing the competitiveness of the countries of the region and, in so far as 
possible, constituting the building blocks for a more open and transparent international economy” (ECLAC 1994, p.8). 
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I. Regional Perspectives on the 
Multilateral Trading System and 
Doha Development Agenda 
A. Multilateralism vs. Regionalism: the latter 
as a “Building Block” or “Stumbling 
Block” for the former 
As acknowledged in the recently published WTO Report of the 
Consultative Board to the Director General (WTO 2004), nearly five 
decades after the founding of the GATT, the principle of non-
discrimination characterized by the Most Favored Nation (MFN) 
clause ceased to be the rule of international trading system. While 
much trade between the major economies still takes place on an MFN 
basis,4 the proliferation of PTAs involving customs unions, regional 
and bilateral FTAs (RTAs and BTAs respectively) and other 
arrangements, has made MFN treatment an exception rather than the 
rule. “Certainly the term might now be better defined as LFN, Least-
Favoured-Nation treatment” (p.19). In fact, by the time of WTO 
creation, “the principle of non-discrimination had been badly dented” 
by many countries that grant concessional market access under either 
Article XXIV, the Enabling Clause, Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP) schemes, or other trade arrangements. As a piece of  
                                                     
4 The extent to which these arrangements have been used can be illustrated by the fact that the European Union now has its MFN 
tariffs fully applicable to only nine trading partners (Australia, Canada, Taiwan Province of China, Hong Kong, China, Japan, 
Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Singapore and the United States. All other EU trading partners are covered by some types of 
PTAs. 
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evidence, the number of PTAs was on a steady rise even before the creation of WTO in 1995, and 
it has mushroomed since then. Latin America and the Caribbean has been an active participant in 
this process (see figure 1).5 According to World Bank calculations, nearly all countries belong to at 
least one RTA, and some are party to numerous agreements. On average, each country belongs to 
six RTAs, most active being those of Eastern Europe, Northern Africa, and Latin America. Not 
only the number of PTAs is on a rise but also the configuration of RTAs/BTAs is quite diverse and 
becoming increasingly complex with overlapping PTAs and networks of RTAs spanning within 
and across continents at the regional and sub-regional levels. One interesting aspect is the 
emergence of PTAs among key developing countries, which may be a piece of evidence of 
strengthened of South-South trade, specially in Asia, where the Republic of Korea, China, 
Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, and lately India are very active (Arashiro, Marin and Chacoff, 
2005). 
Figure 1 
RTAS REPORTED TO THE WTO, 1960-2004 AND PROJECTED FOR THE END OF 2007 
(World Total and Latin American and Caribbean countriesa) 
Source: ECLAC, Division of International Trade and Integration, based on WTO  
a Include GATT, Art. XXIV (trade in goods); GATS, Art. V (trade in services), and the Enabling Clause (regional 
integration between developing countries) 
 
 
In parallel to the above process, over the years the multilateral trade agenda has undergone 
significant changes, progressively shifting from negotiations on reciprocal tariff reductions to the 
inclusion of “behind-the-border” measures and substantially increasing the need for, and changing 
the nature of, special and differential treatment (SDT) and development policy flexibility. These 
changes have increasingly encroached upon countries' domestic rules, legislation and institutions, 
leaving little scope for national autonomy. In the above process, the “single undertaking”, which 
was one of the most important innovations in the Uruguay Round and which was also applied to the 
FTAA process until very recently, has become a negotiation norm. This differs substantially from 
the “code reciprocity” approach adopted in previous rounds of multilateral trade negotiations, 
                                                     
5 As of January 2005, 312 RTAs/PTAs have been notified to the GATT/WTO, 196 of which were notified after January 1995. Of 
these, 170 are currently in force and additional 65 are estimated to be operational, though not notified. By the end of 2007, if all 
PTAs reportedly planned or already under negotiation are concluded, the total number of PTAs in force could reach 300 (WTO 

























































Regional Agreements notifies to WTO


















CEPAL − SERIE Comercio internacional N° 58 
 
11 
whereby countries could choose which of the various agreements (or “codes”) they would sign and 
implement. While the major GATT principle of non-discrimination is being increasingly 
dishonored, the practice of leveling the playing field based on the principle of reciprocity has 
gained strength. At the same time, the granting of “national treatment” and the multiplicity of 
reciprocity-based FTAs among different levels of development has become the general rule. 
The proliferation of RTAs/BTAs has in a sense reflected frustration of many governments 
with the multilateral system and its approach. Proponents of PTAs have justified these agreements 
on the ground that groups of countries, smaller than the full membership the WTO, may reduce the 
complexity of full multilateral negotiations and thus make progress more feasible and even desire 
to develop trade relationships that are “broader” and “deeper” than what are achievable on a global 
scale. In the view of many, this approach, along the line of “Open Regionalism”, can provide the 
needed push to the slow-moving multilateral system. They also consider that the reverse of the 
“WTO-plus” effect can also take place, in the sense that resolutions made at the WTO level, such 
as the reduction of the bound tariff rate at the Uruguay Round, can become starting points for tariff-
reduction programs in RTAs/BTAs. These agreements might give spillover effects on other FTAs, 
resulting in increasing liberalization commitments, as happened in the case of the Chile-Canada 
FTA, which raised the bar for the rapidly aging Chile-Mexico agreement, thus leading to its 
upgrade in 1998 from an Economic Complementation Agreement (ECA) to an FTA. 
Critics of PTAs, on the other hand, have based their arguments basically on three accounts: 
a) complexity; b) trade-offs between PTAs as “building blocks” or “stumbling blocks; and c) 
concerns on the “behind-the-border” issues (WTO 2004; Crawford and Fiorentino 2005): 
1. Complexity 
This criticism is related to the complexity of administrating different PTAs (the so-called 
“Spaghetti bowl” phenomenon). Multiple preferential rates are being applied to multiple trading 
partners, with different tariff elimination schedules to reach effective zero tariffs or low-duty 
preferential rates. Each country that is Member of a particular RTA/BTA maintains its own tariff 
structure vis-à-vis third parties. The administration of preferential rules of origin is also complex 
and in many cases inconsistent; in the absence of harmonized rules of origin, “local value-added” 
or “transformation” test criteria are being established arbitrarily. These complexities and 
administrative costs involved are particularly burdensome for small- and medium-sized firms and 
small traders, particularly of those in developing countries. 
It should be reminded that the costs of having a myriad of agreements derive from the 
problems not only in achieving coherence and convergence among agreements, but also in 
coordinating negotiators efforts, and in monitoring the negotiation and implementation processes, 
as well as using effectively the dispute settlement mechanisms. There also exists a problem that 
decision makers of the private sector must reach consensus on a complex, and often conflictive, 
business prospect that results from various negotiations. At the same time, the multiplicity of 
negotiation areas requires the availability of highly capable professionals in distinct areas on 
different geographical fronts. Also, the incorporation in this process of interrelated, multiple 
negotiation areas calls for participation of government officials from various ministries and 
departments and articulation of their coordinated efforts with other economic agents, particularly of 
the private sector (Jara 2001, Kuwayama 2003). The costs involved in the diversion of skilled and 
experienced negotiation resources into PTAs, especially for developing countries, are usually too 
great to permit adequate focus on the multilateral stage. 
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2. “Building blocks ” or “stumbling blocks” 
The second issue is the question of PTAs being “building blocks ” or “stumbling blocks” in 
achieving greater market access at the multilateral level. The possibility for the former is greater 
when open-membership to the group is assured, but this is not the case in most situations. One 
important ingredient of this argument is “competitive liberalization”,6 which essentially suggests 
that PTAs with the so-called "can-do" countries will stoke a desire for additional deals and create 
the building blocks for a more liberalized global trade network, and that participation in PTAs 
encourages liberalization on multiple fronts and contributes to innovative policies in areas such as 
investment rules and market regulation. According to this strategy, “PTAs would continue to 
expand and to merge until one single PTA encompassing the whole world is left. Basically, the fear 
of being excluded from narrower deals can induce non-member countries to join the group or/and 
to accept a broader agreement.” (Andriamananjara 2003, p.5). In the context of the western 
hemisphere, for instance, NAFTA preferences among its three member countries would encourage 
other countries in the hemisphere to become part of the FTAA, as the FTAA itself would stimulate 
a multilateral round of trade liberalization. 
The Consultative Board to the WTO Director General (WTO 2004a) is of the opinion that 
while there may be some truth to this proposition, the unregulated proliferation of PTAs tends to 
create vested interests that make it more difficult to attain meaningful multilateral liberalization. 
Also, the last generation of PTAs tends to divert attention from the still core-issues for developing 
countries of market access to trade in goods and services. These agreements are creating complex 
networks of trade regimes potentially undermining transparency and predictability in international 
trade relations. Therefore, “while the so-called “WTO-plus” PTAs may act as testing grounds for 
new multilateral trade policy disciplines and regulations, the discretion enjoyed by PTA parties in 
designing such regulatory regimes can strike a serious WTO minus note for the multilateral trading 
system.” (p.23). 
3. “Behind-the-border” issues 
Another related concern is that the injection of “behind-the-border” issues (intellectual 
property rights, labor and environmental issues in particular) into PTAs might serve as 
“prototypes” for future PTAs and act as forerunners of new demands in the WTO. As an increasing 
number of countries concede non-trade provisions in their PTAs, these WTO member countries 
become less hesitant to stand against demands for their eventual inclusion into the multilateral rules 
and disciplines. In the western hemisphere, many FTAs mimicking the NAFTA are a good example 
of this “template” phenomenon. If such rules and disciplines “cannot be justified at the front door 
of the WTO, they probably should not be encouraged to enter through the side door” (WTO 2004a 
p.23) of the RTAs/PTAs. 
The above discussion is a good illustration of the magnitude of WTO’s difficulties in 
advancing toward the goal that its rules create trade among RTAs members without discrimination 
against third parties.7 This goal has been addressed in the Doha Round negotiations through the 
consultations on RTA disciplines and procedures as well as under the “development dimension” 
umbrella. 
The above-mentioned report (WTO 2004a) also casts doubt on the effectiveness of SDT. 
Although SDT is part of the WTO obligations and remains a valid concept, it also recognizes that 
its administration has not been free of problems. The report is emphatic in saying that empirical 
                                                     
6 The term “competitive liberalization” was coined by Fred Bersgten (1996). 
7 WTO provisions that rule the compatibility of RTAs and other PTAs with the multilateral system are Article XXIV of the GATT, the 
Enabling Clause, and Article V of GATS (WTO, 1995). 
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studies of the impact of GSP schemes suggest little benefit accruing to developing countries via 
such preferences, and that in the more rapidly growing countries such as the Republic of Korea, 
Taiwan Province of China, and others, there is little evidence that SDT has played much of a role 
in their trade performance (p.25). In practice, the GSP recipient countries have been burdened with 
obligations unrelated to trade, which are often expressed as conditions to receiving such 
preferences. In short, by accepting discriminating preferences, the GSP-eligible countries may be 
called upon to accept what are principally developed countries’ “behind-the-border” agendas and 
other conditions. In addition, the interests of grantor, rather than grantee, countries have tended to 
determine the product coverage and the GSP preference margins. Many areas of potential 
comparative advantage of developing countries have been subject to tight tariff quotas and strict 
rules of origin, apart of modest preference margins. In addition, GSP beneficiaries tend to be 
trapped to become dependent on preferences at the cost of industrial and agricultural diversification 
(p.26). 
The foregoing comments are part of the debate on the development dimension in the Doha 
Round that involves basically two areas: i) implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreements 
(URAs); and ii) special and differential treatment (SDT). Regarding the first, a Doha decision 
established several specific tasks in negotiation and studies on matters corresponding to several 
URAs. With respect to the second, debates have been focused on how to reinforce the existing 
provisions in order to make them more precise, effective and operative.8 Both tasks have been 
complemented by work programs on the areas of great interest to developing countries. —small 
economies; trade, debt and finances; and transfer of technology—, as well as the provisions to 
reinforce technical assistance, capacity building and special measures for the Least-Developed 
Countries (LDCs). Admittedly, all these tasks have made little progress since the Cancun 
Ministerial: the negotiation agenda has been focused mainly on market access —in agriculture and 
others—, and some new normative matters. Also, little progress has been made on the issue of 
classification of developing countries, a topic on which developed countries have been quite vocal. 
The lack of convergence in all these areas has resulted in successive prorogations of the established 
negotiation schedules for areas that are high priorities for developing countries.9 
As the WTO report concludes, governments should be conscious of the damage being done 
to, and serious ramifications for, the multilateral trading system before they embark on new 
discriminatory initiatives. If the motivation is to promote “behind-the-border” agendas or simply to 
wish to “catch up” with others or follow suit, they should show restraint in pursuing PTAs (p.26). 
On the other hand, PTAs are a today’s reality and are here to stay; existing PTAs cannot be 
eliminated or scale-downed and new ones cannot be prohibited. In this sense, it is important that 
stipulations regarding Article XXIV be clarified and a better–organized means of administering the 
provisions on PTAs be put in place. Nonetheless, a much more effective remedy is to attack the 
adverse effects of discriminatory preferences through meaningful reduction and/or total elimination 
of MFN tariffs and non-tariff barriers in multilateral trade negotiations, principally by developed 
countries. 
B. The multilateral negotiation agenda of the Latin American and 
Caribbean countries 
Governments in the region perceive a serious imbalance between the rights and obligations 
and between the costs and benefits for the different groups of countries of fulfilling their 
                                                     
8 Those areas refer basically to the provisions on providing greater trade opportunities, safeguarding the interests of developing 
countries, and conceding greater flexibility and timetables to comply with the commitments by these countries.  
9 This issue has been debated in the Committee on Trade and Development (see WTO document: TN/CTD). 
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commitments under the URAs. The export sectors of interest to them are not only slow to open, but 
they often do so in conjunction with the introduction of measures that undermine earlier 
obligations. This is particularly true of the agricultural sector, but it is also the case for contingency 
protection mechanisms and even the resurrection of "voluntary export restraints" in sectors where 
the countries of the region have been successful in conquering the markets of industrialized 
countries. While Haiti is the only country in the region that is classified as a least developed 
country, all the countries of the region are working to achieve a more competitive form of 
integration into the world economy, and to do so, they need time, resources and a supportive 
environment for creating employment and promoting growth in their economies. 
Numerous studies that evaluate the welfare impacts of the URAs and potential benefits and 
costs of the Doha Round outcomes conclude that the most significant impact will be attributed to 
agricultural liberalization and the largest welfare gains will be in market access liberalization of 
this sector. However, this sector is characterized by marked heterogeneity even among the 
countries of the region; some are major exporters at the global level while others are net importers 
of these products and some developing countries still maintain high levels of protection in 
agriculture. Estimates on gains from trade facilitation also vary significantly. In addition to the 
problem of market access, there is a concern among developing countries on the costs of and 
difficulties in implementing their commitments, especially of a normative nature. In recognition of 
Finger and Schuler (1999) study on possible implementation costs of URAs,10 there has been 
increasing awareness among the countries in the region that this task would require large human 
and financial resources because implementing the commitments already made and those are in 
negotiation would involve far-reaching reforms in their institutional systems. 
For the countries in the region, the Uruguay Round commitments may have fallen basically 
upon the wide-ranging reforms of the 1980s. This might mean that, in general terms, they did not 
entail high adjustment costs for these countries, except in some specific areas such as intellectual 
property rights or specific subsidies (Lengyel and Ventura, 2004). This generally accepted view is 
now complemented by more recent studies, which show that adjustment costs highly depend on the 
area of policy reform, the initial capacity with which the country starts, as well as the degree of 
adjustment required relative to political priorities and needs of the country in question. The study 
on Argentina, for example, illustrates that the implementation processes were very institution-
intensive and costly, and called for complementary policies as well as a broader and more active 
engagement of the private sector (Lengyel, 2005). It concludes that the WTO framework usually 
has a bias toward a particular institutional arrangement, and that policy space to address their 
development needs is often curtailed. For these reasons as well, the capability of WTO to construct 
solid trade rues is now being challenged, not only by its own limited accomplishments so far, but 
also its lack of vision on what an appropriate global trade architecture should consist of and how to 
construct it.  
The Doha Declaration placed the Latin American and Caribbean region’s needs and interests 
at the heart of the work programme. These included, inter alia, the outstanding implementation-
related issues11 and the need to ensure full implementation of the SDT provisions; the importance 
of correcting and preventing restrictions and distortions in world agricultural markets; the reduction 
or elimination of tariff peaks, high tariffs, tariff escalation, and non-tariff barriers to export 
products of interest to developing countries; and the implementation and interpretation of the 
TRIPS Agreement in a manner supportive of public health. In addition, WTO members decided to 
address issues relating to: (i) the fuller integration of small, vulnerable economies into the 
                                                     
10 The study evaluates the implementation costs of the following URAs: customs valuation, sanitary and phytosanitary standards, and 
intellectual property rights.  
11 Developing countries call for an accurate definition and an effective implementation of several topics of the Uruguay Round  
(UNCTAD 2003b, p.7). 
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multilateral trading system; (ii) the relationship among trade, debt and finance; and (iii) the 
relationship between trade and technology transfer. The Latin American and Caribbean countries 
were convinced that these topics should receive the same consideration as the formulation of new 
disciplines in areas of interest to industrial countries, such as the relationship between trade and the 
so-called Singapore issues. The countries of the region also saw an urgent need to address the 
multiple issues that operate in the interface of trade, development and globalization, such as 
poverty, the environment, culture, gender, migration, food security and rural development, 
competition, enterprise development, employment and public interest.12 
The new round of multilateral trade negotiations initiated in Doha at the end of 2001 led to 
expectations in Latin America and the Caribbean that it would constitute a “Development Round”. 
However, the two years of preparatory work and the subsequent deliberations at the Fifth WTO 
Ministerial Conference, held in Cancun, Mexico, in September 2003, were unsuccessful in building 
consensus on such major issues as agriculture, non-agricultural market access (NAMA), SDT, 
implementation-related questions and the Singapore issues. The Cancun conference saw the 
emergence of new dynamics in multilateral trade negotiations, such as issue-based coalitions of 
developing countries. The cementing of developing countries into issue-based coalitions led to 
concerns regarding their empowerment in the multilateral trading system, on the one hand, and the 
possible emergence of a new North-South divide in multilateral trade negotiations, on the other.13 
The Cancún setback was seen by many to undermine commitments to multilateralism and fuel the 
vigorous pursuit of bilateralism and regionalism.  
The debates that arose in the wake of the Doha conference and, in particular, after the Fifth 
Ministerial Conference in Cancun, have pushed back the conclusion of this round beyond its 
original deadline. Very divergent positions that continued to exist in the aftermath of Cancun, 
together with the unlikelihood of these gaps being closed shortly, raised serious doubts on the final 
outcome of Doha Round. The main stumbling blocks to progress in these talks were encountered in 
the work on agricultural reform and the debates on the development dimension (including SDT and 
implementation-related issues). The Cancun Ministerial inherited this climate of discord, which 
was exacerbated by the controversy over the so-called “Singapore issues”, which the developing 
countries staunchly resisted. The disagreements that had arisen after the Cancun conference were 
broadly resolved by a decision taken on 1 August 2004, known as the “July package”.  
Be that as it may, the July package did change the climate of the post-Cancun talks and 
steered the process in a new direction by determining a number of important matters: (i) the start of 
negotiations on trade facilitation, which was the only Singapore issue on which consensus was 
reached; (ii) an agreement to eliminate subsidies on agricultural exports, reduce and discipline 
subsidy-equivalent measures, secure a substantial reduction in trade-distorting domestic support 
and incorporate negotiations on cotton; (iii) guidelines for the liberalization of industrial goods 
based on bound tariffs, without admitting new sub-categories of developing countries but 
reaffirming the flexibility and corresponding technical assistance required by those countries; and 
(iv) the establishment of new deadlines for certain tasks, including dispute settlement, development 
issues and services offers (WTO, 2004b). This new orientation in turn called for new technical 
work to be carried out and negotiation to be made in the following months. 
                                                     
12 Some of these issues are already addressed in the Doha Ministerial Declaration. 
13 At Cancun, the configuration of the various groupings and clusters, which included the G-20, attested to the conditions and active 
participation of the developing countries. After that conference, however, new alliances have formed that cut across the pre-existing 
ones. One such cluster involves a handful of WTO members, most of which are large economies from the developed and developing 
worlds, who have differing positions on a given issue. Other group forums are also playing an increasingly important role. These 
groups, which take the form of “mini-ministerial meetings” and sessions held within the framework of conferences convened by 
other international bodies, are helping to coordinate different parties’ interests and help to move the negotiating process forward. 
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In the area of agriculture, it still remains very difficult to specify modalities for the three 
pillars of agricultural reform, since there are major differences in the countries’ underlying 
structures, be they tariff- or subsidy-based. In addition, exporting countries are not in favor of the 
proposals that have been tabled for increasing the flexibility and diversification of instruments or 
for establishing differentiated deadlines for developing countries (which is also an aspect of 
modality definition), and wish to see a limit on such concessions. Lastly, the possibility of agreeing 
to a standstill commitment until the round is completed is another key issue. Although some 
progress has been made in 2005, a consensus does not yet exist regarding even a preliminary 
approach to the establishment of modalities in this connection. On top of this, developed economies 
have been challenged in various controversies to revise their policies on sensitive sectors such as 
agricultural domestic support.  
Up to November 2005, the work on market access for non-agricultural goods had focused on 
modalities and technical questions such as conversion to ad valorem equivalents, the treatment of 
unbound tariffs and sectoral liberalization. Issues of particular concern to developing countries 
include the proposed degree of tariff binding and a cap on unbound tariffs. Along with agricultural 
issues, much of the work has centered on defining a tariff reduction formula and determining what 
flexibilities are to be extended to developing countries. These are all issues about which developed 
and developing countries have strongly disagreed. The last sessions of the Negotiating Group on 
NAMA revealed a continued lack of convergence in Members approaches. Discussions on 
industrial tariff reduction have hardly moved in months due to Members awaiting signals from the 
agriculture negotiations (Bridges, Year 9 No. 9, page 6). The pace of negotiations on services has 
picked up in recent months, but progress on the requests-and-offers process and in the discussions 
on rules and cross-cutting issues has been so slow that the talks on these matters may be reaching a 
crisis point. 
Trade facilitation is an important area that has been brought into the negotiations on trade 
rules and has received many proposals from a large number of countries, North and South alike, but 
little progress has been made towards specific rules on antidumping and subsidies. Deadlines for 
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects on Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) linked with 
public health have been reviewed, but the proposals made by developing countries regarding the 
distribution of benefits do not appear to have been taken up. These issues clearly have an impact on 
competitiveness, and although the developing countries are in need of such regulations, they are 
reluctant to move forward in these areas because of the costs involved. 
With regard to cross-cutting institutional matters, some headway has been achieved on 
development issues with the incorporation of the cotton initiative, but less progress has been made 
in other areas of work; the talks on the constraints affecting developing countries, particularly in 
regard to implementation-related issues are far behind schedule. More specific guidelines or signals 
are expected for the Dispute Settlement Body, though not part of the single undertaking. This WTO 
mechanism operates reasonably well and could help to carry the negotiations forward. The work on 
regional trade agreements has made headway on transparency, and as its pace picks up, it may help 
to spur the talks on other topics. 
Although no new date has been set for the completion of the Doha Round, it is tentatively 
expected to conclude in 2006. This will depend, however, on the outcome of the forthcoming Sixth 
Ministerial Conference, to be held in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China in 
December 2005. The recent meeting of the General Council of WTO, held on 29 July 2005, which 
was expected to be a landmark event in this process, failed to give any sign of a convergence of the 
countries’ positions. As in other stages, greater difficulties were encountered in agriculture, despite 
the proposals made in October by the major countries. The United States proposed that by the end 
of a five-year implementation period, developed country tariffs should be cut by 55 to 90 %. 
CEPAL − SERIE Comercio internacional N° 58 
 
17 
Developing countries would be subject to “slightly lesser reduction commitments and longer phase-
in periods to be determined when base parameters for developed countries commitments are 
established”. The European Union demands more flexibility within the tiers, compensated by 
steeper cuts on other tariff lines. It proposed a 20% cut in the lowest of the four tiers and a 50% 
reduction in the highest (above 90%) tier. In addition, the G-20 group of developing countries 
tabled a revised tariff proposal, which showed a marked difference in cuts suggested for developed 
and developing countries. On the other hand, the G-10 group of net food-importing countries,14 
who tend to have notoriously high tariff peaks on a number of products, is being increasingly 
isolated in its adamant opposition to tariff caps (see Table 1). In summary, there are many 
proposals, but little convergence. This reality and the recent evolution have led the new WTO 
General Director, Mr. Pascal Lamy, to solicit the members to reduce the expectation on the 
forthcoming Ministerial in Hong Kong. Obviously, the lack of concrete results in this conference 
would jeopardize the successful conclusion of Doha Round in 2006. 
Table 1 
TARIFF REDUCTION PROPOSALS IN AGRICULTURE NEGOTIATIONS, AS OF OCTOBER 2005 
A.- G-20 B.- United States 
Developed countries Developing countries Developed countries Developing countries 
Tiers Cuts Tiers Cuts Tiers Cuts Tiers Cuts 
0-20% 45% 0-30% 25% 0-20% 55-65% 
20-50% 55% 30-80% 30% 20- 40% 65-75% 
50-75% 65% 80-130% 35% 40-60% 75-85% 
>75% 75% >130% 40% >60% 85-90% 
Same tiers, slightly smaller 
cuts, to be decided after 
parameters are agreed for 
developed countries 
Cap: 100% Cap: 150% Cap: 75% Cap: 100% 
  
C.- European Union D.- G-10 
Developed countries Developing countries Developed countries Developing countries 
Tiers Cuts Tiers Cuts Tiers Cutsa Tiers Cutsb 
Lowest Tier 20% 0-20% 27% 0-30% … 
… … 20-50% 31% 30 - 70% … 
… … 50-70% 37% 70-100% … 
> 90% 50% 
No specific proposal  
>70% 45% > 100% … 
Cap: 100% Cap: 150% Cap: none Cap: none 
Source: Bridges, Year 9 No.9 September – October 2005, page 7 
a The G-10 specified that the percentages for cuts in its proposal were only illustrative. 
b The G-10 did not offer potential values for developing country reductions. 
 
The role that the WTO rules play in providing stability and predictability to the global trade 
and investment environment is well known and can be considered as an international “public 
good”. However, in order to enable its Member countries to reap full benefits of this public good, 
the WTO must provide them with momentous support for institution-building purposes. This is 
important especially from the viewpoint of Latin America and the Caribbean, where the impact of 
trade liberalization on growth and export expansion has not been as favorable as desired, and its 
effects on improvement in supply-side capacities has been even less propitious. Arguably, a 
strengthened trade controversy mechanism at the WTO has allowed developing countries to defend 
more effectively the cases before market distortions imposed by developed countries, particularly 
in agriculture (for example, in the recent cases of sugar and cotton). In this respect, it is noteworthy 
that some countries of the region have played a protagonist role in these claims. 
                                                     
14 The G-10 comprises Bulgaria, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Korea, Liechtenstein, Mauritius, Norway, Switzerland and Taiwan. 
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C. Participation of Latin America and the Caribbean in the Doha 
Agenda 
Virtually all the Latin American and Caribbean countries belong to WTO and have joined 
other developing countries in formulating, endorsing and advancing the Doha agenda. In more 
recent years, the Latin American and Caribbean countries have participated in different interest 
groups configurations and have played an increasing role in formulating technical proposals, 
especially since the Seattle meeting. The countries of the region have shown a special interest in 
continued reform in agriculture, either individually or in coalitions, and in protecting their often 
divergent interests at every stage of the technical work and negotiations (ECLAC 2003b). Their 
strong interest in agriculture is understandable, not only because the region is probably the most 
efficient agricultural and agro-industrial producer, but also because of the worldwide economic 
gains made possible by multilateral liberalization. According to estimates by the World Bank 
(2002), the income gains to be derived from agricultural liberalization account for more than three 
quarters of the gains to be achieved from free trade in all goods, and the Latin American and 
Caribbean countries, particularly those of MERCOSUR, would be the largest beneficiaries of a 
meaningful form of multilateral agricultural liberalization (Nogués 2004). Of course, there are large 
differences among the countries in the region, in terms of the agricultural role in trade 
specialization, and also inside the sector in each country. For this reason, even on this subject that 
raises strong interest of the countries and participation in negotiations, it is difficult to talk of a 
“unified” regional vision or front on the subject matter. 
The region has also become more proactive on the issue of market access in industrial goods, 
which can be partly explained by the increasing share of manufactures in their export basket.15 For 
some countries manufactures provide bright potential to expand South-South trade. In addition, the 
proposals made on NAMA take into account the interest of developing countries to preserve 
existing policy space, for example, through possible application of “bound” rather than “applied” 
effective tariff rates. This proactive posture has been also present in other areas such as 
antidumping or intellectual property. With respect to the former, the region has been affected by its 
arbitrary application in market access to developed economy markets and it intends to reduce the 
arbitrariness in its use. In fact, five countries in the region form part of the Group to promote better 
practices on the use of antidumping. Regarding the latter; several countries in the region have 
shown determined interest in bringing about a better distribution of benefits associated with it.16 By 
contrast, some countries of the region were relatively reticent on several Singapore issues, a subject 
matter that was “resolved” in the July Package of 2004. In many proposals, the countries of the 
region try to preserve policy space for development, which includes the issue of SDT operability 
and improvement of their implementation. 
Regarding trade facilitation in which the region participates actively in its negotiation group 
(see Table 2), at least two areas of interests can be identified for the countries in the region. On the 
one hand, an important number of countries in the region are actively participating in a proposal on 
trade facilitation from a developing country perspective;17 and on the other, Bolivia and Paraguay 
have been active participants in negotiation from the standpoint of “land-locked” countries. 
                                                     
15 See, for example, the proposals by Chile, Colombia and Mexico, on the one hand, and the Argentina, Brazil and India proposals, on 
the other, in WTO documents (WTO: TN/MA/W/50 and 54). The proposals allow developing countries to strike a balance among 
the extent of tariff reduction required by the formula through the use of different coefficients, leaving tariff lines unbound, the 
ability to exempt some products from the tariff reduction formula, and the implementation period for tariff cuts (Bridges Year 9 No. 
2-3, page 11). 
16 In addition, the region played an important role in the debate on TRIPs and public health. 
17 The communication of 13 Latin American countries (WTO: TN/TF/W/41), was also signed byfour more countries. 
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With respect to trade in services, developed countries have sought to improve market access 
in those sectors where they have comparative advantages, including financial services, 
telecommunications, energy production and distribution, gas production and distribution, and 
others. Meanwhile, the Latin American and Caribbean countries have primarily been concerned 
with ensuring compliance with provisions of particular interest to developing countries.18 They 
have also stressed the need for a more suitable classification, a matter that was included in many of 
the sectoral proposals (ECLAC 2003b). The Latin American and Caribbean countries have placed a 
high priority on addressing the issue of constraints on the movement of natural persons across 
borders to supply services (Mode 4) under the GATS, especially with respect to the recognition of 
professional titles and licenses and to residency and nationality requirements. Despite the 
importance that negotiations on Mode 4 have for developing countries,19 no progress has been 
made in the multilateral negotiations in this area. 
With respect to the issue of trade as it relates to debt and finance, the Latin American and 
Caribbean countries have showed a special interest in the vulnerability of commodity-dependent 
countries, market access to finance foreign debt, exchange rate instability and international policy 
coherence. Technology transfer, especially in TRIPS, has also been of major concern.20 Caribbean 
countries, for their part, presented an integral regional perspective on the vulnerability of small 
economies, while Bolivia and Paraguay were among the land-locked countries who issued a 
communiqué on the work program on small economies. These countries, together with several from 
Central America, have been most proactive in this area.21  
In the post-Cancún negotiations, practically all the Latin American and Caribbean countries 
are represented in one of the three groups constituted by different developing countries, especially 
around agricultural negotiation. Brazil has actively participated in the G20 and played a leadership 
role in this group (see Table 2).22 Similarly, the Cairns Group, which calls for a deeper 
liberalization of the sector, has a wide participation of the countries of the region. The CARICOM 
countries agreed with African and Pacific countries on a series of proposals, looking at SDT and 
the institutional issues of WTO such as transparency.23 In groups created in conjunction with other 
thematic interests, the countries of the region has been very active, especially in antidumping, 
intellectual property rights, disciplines on fishery subsidies, and trade facilitation.  
However, the negotiation dynamics since 2004 has added new organizational forms, initially 
in works in agriculture, grouping major players with diverse interests. This is the case of NG-5 
(FIP-Five interested parties), formed by the United States, European Union, Brazil, India and 
Australia, which has provided certain operability to the one of the most complex issues and with 
extreme tensions within the negotiation group. 
In the formation of country groupings based on common negotiating stances, the Latin 
American and Caribbean region has come to play an important and, to some extent, leadership role 
                                                     
18 These countries were clearly concerned with ensuring compliance with articles IV and XIX(2). The effective implementation of 
Article IV of the GATS includes access for developing countries to technology, improvement in their access to distribution channels 
and information networks, and liberalization of market access in sectors and modes of supply of services. Article XIX2 allows 
flexibility for developing countries to liberalize fewer sectors and attach access conditions to foreign service suppliers. Twenty-two 
Latin America and Caribbean countries have tabled proposals for negotiations either individually and jointly with other countries. 
19 Under the assumpltion that developed countries fill a quota of temporary workers equivalent to 3% of their labour force, the gains to 
the world economy are on the order of US$150 billion (Winters et al. 2003). 
20 With regard to debt, see WTO (WT/WGTDF/W); with respect to technology transfer, see WTO (WT/WGTTT). 
21 CARICOM countries have emphasized a compounded nature of difficulties that the small and vulnerable economies face —limited 
human, financial and natural resources, as well as the small market size that limits the number and scope of business actors, the 
scale of production and development options—. These countries have requested, therefore, a holistic approach to  marginalization, 
and at the same time, have opposed the creation of new categories of WTO members (WT/COMTD/SE/W/14, 10.10.05) (See also 
Stewart, 2005a). 
22  After the Cancún Conference, several countries that were negotiating or about to begin negotiating an FTA with the United States 
withdrew from the group. 
23 For further information, see Venezuela and CARICOM (WTO documents WT/MIN(03)/ST/48 and 6). 
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among the developing countries (ECLAC, 2005). Structural and policy-based differences that exist, 
however, make it difficult to arrive at a consensus position on all the issues under consideration. 
Given the countries’ differing economic sizes, production and commercial structures, trade policies 
and development strategies, unified action in all the areas under negotiation is a highly complex 
undertaking. This hinders efforts to formulate a “regional” proposal for Doha, on the one hand, 
and, on the other, encourages the formation of shifting alliances among countries of the region. The 
challenge here is to build upon those areas where the countries’ views do converge while providing 
scope for subtly differing stances on the rest without undercutting the cohesiveness of the 
countries’ positions on the main issues, especially agriculture and the development dimension. 
Under these circumstances, it is all the more important to devise strategies for positioning the 
countries within the development process. The countries of the region are also increasingly aware 
of the need to complement trade agreements with domestic policies (forming what has come to be 
known as the “domestic agenda”) in such areas as competitiveness, infrastructure, technological 
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II. Regionalism, Bilateralism and 
Hemispheric Integration 
Over the last two decades, the Latin American and Caribbean 
region has been a showcase of trade liberalization and economic 
reforms for the entire world. Both the region’s exports and imports 
showed great strength. The physical volume of exports grew at an 
unprecedented rate between 1991 and 2000 (9.3% annually) —above 
the world average and exceeded only by China and India. The 
problems in the international economy in 2001-2002 interrupted this 
growth, which recovered, however, in 2003 and 2004. The majority of 
the countries in the region experienced strong growth in exports —in 
the neighborhood of 8% annually (ECLAC 2004a). The high export 
orientation of the region’s countries, combined with the protectionist 
practices of the developed countries, in turn, has made the issue of 
market access more imperative. 
The opening-up policy of these countries has been implemented 
via three (unilateral, regional and multilateral) routes towards 
liberalization. Between the mid-1980s and 1990s, the region 
unilaterally reduced its average external tariff from over 40% to 
11%.24 The region also actively participated in the Uruguay Round and 
made substantial commitments to dismantle import barriers by binding 
practically all tariff lines. In more recent years, however, the 
governments of the  region have been particularly  active in reaching 
                                                     
24 The average maximum tariffs in the region were lowered from more than 80% to 40%, and only two countries now apply maximum 
tariffs of up to 100% on a small number of products. Tariff dispersion, on average, has declined from 30% in the mid-1980s to a low 
of 9% today. Both the highest average rate and the highest dispersion rate, as measured by the standard deviation, are currently 
under 15% (for details, see IDB 2000, table 15). 
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bilateral and plurilateral, as well as intra- and extra-regional preferential agreements. The rationale 
for this is that unilateral liberalization does not guarantee the openness of target markets; in an 
economy that is undergoing globalization and regionalization simultaneously, countries seek 
strategies for positioning themselves in major import markets in ways that will give their products 
greater and more reliable access to those markets. 
In fact, in 1991, sub-regional preferential agreements were practically the only ones in force. 
They were associated with the region’s four imperfect customs unions. These customs unions 
represented roughly 6% of total exports of the region, while the rest of the region’s exports took 
place outside of the framework of preferential agreements. This situation changed dramatically in 
the 1990s. Considering the export structure by destinations for the period of 2001-2002 and current 
PTAs, 62.4% of the region’s exports seem to have occurred within the framework of various types 
of preferential agreements in 2004, including intra-regional and extra-regional bilateral agreements 
(1.2% and 1.3%, respectively), as well as intra-regional and extra-regional plurilateral agreements 
(10.7% and 49.2%). The most notable cases are Mexico, 95.6% of whose exports fall within extra-
regional agreements; the Central American countries, for which three quarters of exports are within 
the framework of intra- and extra-regional plurilateral agreements; and Chile, more than 70% of 
whose exports take place under various PTAs. In short, between 1991 and 2004, the percentage of 
Latin American and Caribbean exports enjoying tariff preferences rose from 6.1% to 62.4%, with 
evidence of a greater openness towards extra-regional PTAs than intra-regional ones (see Figure 2 
and Table 3). 
It should be pointed out that PTAs should cover 72% of total exports of the entire region in 
2007 once MERCOSUR countries and the Andean Community conclude negotiations with the 
European Union and the United States, respectively. Under this scenario, extra-regional PTAs 
would account for 55% of its total exports, and almost 45% for the four Custom Unions (Andean 
Community, MERCOSUR, CACM and CARICOM) combined (see Figure 3). 




LATIN AMERICA (18): EXPORT FLOWS BY PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS,1991 AND 2004 
(Percentages of total trade) 
 
Source: Author’s calculation on the basis of trade information from the United Nations COMTRADE database. 
a    For estimates of 1991, the two year 1990-1991 were taken into account;   
b   For the estimate of 2004, the two year average 2001-2002 of exports of each country was used to determine the 
trade composition, and the PTAs as of December 31, (including those PTAs negotiations of which have been 
concluded) where taken into account. 
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Bilateral South-North agreements (such as the FTA among the Dominican Republic, Central 
America and the United States (the expanded CAFTA), —which has just been ratified by the 
United States, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua in the second semester of 2005—; the 
agreement between the United States and three countries of the Andean Community (Colombia, 
Ecuador and Peru) that is now being negotiated, and the efforts being made to arrive at an 
association agreement between MERCOSUR and the European Union put added pressure on the 
region’s integration schemes. This is because these FTAs include commitments on wider and more 
far-reaching issues than those addressed by the integration schemes themselves. In practice, South-
North agreements are different in scope and content from those prevailing in the integration 
schemes, and as a consequence new types of disciplines and regulations are likely to take 
precedence over intra-regional laws and standards in certain areas. With respect to investment 
disputes, for example, arbitration under the auspices of the International Centre for Settlements of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID) will be required. Cross-border trade in services, financial services and 
telecommunications will be governed by the new FTA regulations. The same is true for the chapter 
on intellectual property and other areas. 
Figure 3 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN:  TARIFF PREFERENCES AS OF NOVEMBER 2005 


















Source: Authors’ estimates based on official data. 
 
Admittedly, the result of unilateral liberalization for Latin America and the Caribbean as a 
whole has been mixed, with no clear evidence of an acceleration in per capita income growth. The 
industrial countries’ successful experience with multilateralism in the period following the Second 
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World War has not been replicated in developing countries, and the benefits of multilateral trade 
negotiations have not been as substantial as expected for Latin America and the Caribbean, 
probably as a consequence of the fact that the liberalization process has focused on manufactured 
goods (Nogués 2004). Latin America has missed promising trading opportunities due to the lack of 
active participation in the early GATT rounds and the unfavorable outcome of the Uruguay Round 
in terms of agricultural products. The new multi-task scenario described above points to a difficult 
task to preserve the core objectives of integration by rapidly realigning these norms without being 
overtaken by the commitments made in various FTAs. This is a formidable challenge, as the agenda 
must now be configured to tackle the discrepancies that are reflected in more demanding 
commitments made with Northern partners and less rigorous ones with sub-regional group 
members. 
A. An Overview of existing and emerging FTAs in the region 
The hallmark of the region’s trade performance in the 1990s, especially up to 1997, was an 
impressive expansion both in trade within each of the four customs unions and in imports from the 
rest of the world;25 this has led some analysts (Salazar 2002) to argue that there is little evidence of 
trade diversion. This may indeed be the case, especially under circumstances where a simultaneous 
reduction of internal and external barriers based on preferential liberalization measures has been 
accompanied by aggressive unilateral trade reform (one of the main features of the new regionalism 
of Latin America as highlighted by Ethier (1998)), all of which reduces the possibilities for trade 
diversion. It is worth mentioning that the four customs unions have been progressively deepened 
since the 1990s with the inclusion of non-border measures, but they still have a long way to go in 
order to reach a stage of “deep integration”(Crawley 2004, Kuwayama 2005). 
Among the three routes towards trade liberalization mentioned above, bilateral and 
plurilateral FTAs have predominanted over customs unions since the mid-1990s. Moreover, Latin 
American and Caribbean Governments have been working actively to put together a web of these 
arrangements with countries both within and outside the region, while proceeding with the 
negotiations on the creation of FTAA. Mexico and Chile have concluded FTAs with a number of 
countries and regions that are not geographically contiguous, such as the European Union. as well 
as with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Chile has signed an FTA with the United 
States, and other FTAs have been implemented with Canada, the European Union, EFTA and 
several other parties. Central American countries have negotiated an FTA with the United States. 
MERCOSUR is building up an interregional association with the European Union, and there are 
initiatives to cover India and China, among others.  
As mentioned earlier, approximately 62% of Latin American and Caribbean exports in the 
first quarter of 2004 were covered by PTAs (i.e., bilaterals as well as plutilaterals) in one way or 
another and that this coefficient has increased especially sharply since the mid-1990s and 
continuing on into the present decade.26 During this period, the most marked progress has been 
seen in the conclusion of FTAs with countries outside the Latin American and Caribbean region 
proper (see Table 4). In the course of this process, Chile and Mexico have become true “semi-
hubs” for FTAs in the hemisphere. 
 
                                                     
25 This was followed by declines in intra-subregional trade and imports from the rest of the world up to 2002 and a strong recovery in 
2003 and 2004 (ECLAC 2003a and 2005). 
26 This includes the Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), which has already been signed, and the FTA between the 
Republic of Korea and Chile, which has already entered into force. 




LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (SELECTED COUNTRIES): RTAS AND PTAS IN FORCE AND 
NEGOTIATION 
(PTAs concluded and in negotiation, as of 30 November 2005) 






MERCOSUR (3) + Andean Community (5) 
 + Chile (1) = 9 
MERCOSUR – European Uniona 3 9 
Bolivia 
Andean Community (4) + MERCOSUR (4)  
+ Chile (1) + Mexico (1) = 10 
No agreements 4 10 
Brazil 
MERCOSUR (3) + Andean Community (5) 
 + Chile (1) = 9 
MERCOSUR – European Uniona 3 9 
Chile 
MERCOSUR (4) + Andean Community (5) + 
CACM (5) + Cuba (1) + Mexico (1) = 16 
EU (25) + EFTA (4) + United States (1) 
+ Canada (1)  + Korea (1) + New 
Zealand (1), Singapore (1) + Brunei 
Darussalam (1) + China (1)   = 36. 
Negotiating FTA with: India 
16 52 
Colombia Andean Community (4) +  MERCOSUR (4) + 
CARICOM (15) + Chile (1) + Mexico (1) = 25 
Andean Community (3) are negotiating 
a FTA with  United Statesb 
5 25 
Costa Rica 
CACM (4) + Chile (1) +  Mexico (1) 
 + Dominican Republic (1) + Panama (1) + 
Trinidad & Tabago (1) = 9 
United States (CAFTA) (1) 
 +  Canada (1) = 2 
8 11 
Cuba ALADI (11)  + CARICOM (15) = 26 No agreements 26 11 
Ecuador Andean Community (4) + MERCOSUR (4) + 
Cuba (1) 
Andean Community (3) are negotiating 
a FTA with  United Statesb 
3 9 
El Salvador CACM (4) + Dominican Republic (1) + 
Panama (1) + Mexico (1) + Chile (1) = 8 
United States (CAFTA) (1) 6 9 
Guatemala CACM (4) + Dominican Republic (1) + 
Panama (1) + Mexico (1) + Chile (1) = 8 
United States (CAFTA) (1) 6 9 
Honduras CACM (4) + Dominican Republic (1) + 
Panama (1) + Mexico (1) + Chile (1) = 8 
United States (CAFTA) (1) 6 9 
México 
North Triangle (3) + Costa Rica (1) + 
Nicaragua (1) + Chile (1) + Bolivia (1) + 
Uruguay (1) + G3 (2) = 10 
European Union (25)+EFTA (4) + 
NAFTA (2) + Israel (1) + Japan (1) =33 12 43 
Nicaragua CACM (4) + Dominican Republic (1) + 
Panama (1) + Mexico (1) + Chile (1) = 8 
United States (CAFTA) (1) 6 9 
Panama CACM (5) Taiwan, Rep. China (1) 2 6 
Paraguay 
MERCOSUR (3) + Andean Community (5) 
 + Chile (1) = 9 
MERCOSUR – European Uniona 3 9 
Peru 
Andean Community (4) + MERCOSUR (4)  
+ Chile (1) = 9 
Andean Community (3) are negotiating 
a FTA with  United Statesb  Also 





CACM (5) + CARICOM (14) = 19 United States (CAFTA) (1) 3 20 
Uruguay 
MERCOSUR (3) + Andean Community (5) 
 + Chile (1) + Mexico (1) = 10 
MERCOSUR – European Uniona 4 10 
Venezuela 
Andean Community (4) + MERCOSUR (4)  
+ Chile (1) + Mexico (1) + CARICOM (15)= 25 
No agreements 5 25 
CARICOM 
Colombia + Venezuela + Dom. Republic  
+ Costa Rica + Cuba = (5) 
negotiating with Canada and  





Andean Community (5) + MERCOSUR (4) + 
CACM (5) + CARICOM (15) + Chile, Mexico, 
Panama, Cuba and Dominican Republic) = 34 
EU (25) + EFTA (4) + United States (1) + 
Canada (1) + Korea (1) + Israel (1) + 
Taiwan, Rep. China (1) + Japan(1) + New 
Zealand (1), Singapore (1) + Brunei 
Darussalam (1) + China (1)   = 39 
41 73 
Source: Authors, based on legal instruments signed by the countries of the region and sub regions: MERCOSUR (South American 
Common Market) —Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay—. Andean Community —Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and 
Venezuela—, CACM (Central American Common Market) —Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua—, 
Caribbean Community (CARICOM) —Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, 
Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago—, Group 
of Three (G3), and Latin American Integration Association (LAIA). 
a Since 1999, MERCOSUR has been negotiating an Interregional Cooperation Agreement with the European Union. 
b Colombia, Ecuador and Peru are negotiating a FTA with the United States. 
c Include only agreements and countries with concluded negotiations . 
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One of the main features of most of the new trade agreements in the region is that they 
contain front-loaded tariff phase-out programs based on predetermined schedules, which are 
relatively quick, automatic and nearly universal. This contrasts sharply with the detailed step-by-
step development of positive lists that characterized the first-generation trade agreements (Devlin 
and Estevadeordal 2001). In most agreements, the base rates for the liberalization program coincide 
with the MFN applied rates. Most liberalization program in the Latin American and Caribbean 
countries will eliminate tariffs for almost all products by 2005, and most bilateral trade activity 
conducted under these agreements will become fully liberalized, at least in terms of tariffs, within a 
10-year time horizon (Estevadeordal 2002). In this sense, it might be argued that “the trade 
agreements in the region have shown a capacity to liberalize faster than at the multilateral level and 
to include nearly universal coverage of trade liberalization in industrial goods.” (Salazar 2002, 
p.12).  
However, Estevadeordal (2002) points out that although most program will eliminate internal 
tariffs for almost all products by 2005, the internal dynamics of the phase-out schedules varies 
substantially across agreements. For some agreements, more than 50% of the products become free 
of tariffs immediately after entry into effect, while for others, those percentages will not be reached 
until the fifth year or later.27 
As a result, the “spaghetti bowl” of trade agreements diverts trade and creates administrative 
and transparency problems because of these agreements’ varying tariff reduction schedules, rules 
of origin, and technical and procedural systems, along with rather detailed lists of exceptions for 
agriculture and other sectors reflecting the particular sensitivities of each participating country. In 
addition, the liberalization programs that start with the MFN applied rates, rather than the MFN 
bound rates, may leave little development policy maneuvering room. 
Another group of bilateral and plurilateral agreements of relative importance for the region 
are the Economic Complementation Agreements (ECAs), that were very popular during the 
nineties, and whose coverage of commitments have subsequently been widened. The analysis of 12 
areas of trade disciplines covered by the ECAs found that six areas were of greater interest to the 
countries: non-tariff barriers (covered by all the ECAs, 100%), trade remedies —antidumping, 
compensatory rights and safeguards— (89%), dispute settlements disciplines (68%), and sanitary 
and phytosanitary measures (60%) (See Figure 4 and Tables 5a) In the case of the other eight 
disciplines considered in Figure 4, the proportion is not greater than 30%, with the exception of 
cooperation clauses that cover almost 48% and 46% of total ECAs. These figures suggest that this 
type of agreement recognizes increasingly the importance of new rules and disciplines and aspire 
toward a more deep intra-regional integration. But in practice, these ECAs  still remain as a sort of 
“shallow” agreements, because of the “soft” commitments in the areas different to tariff reduction. 
This explains in part the rapid emergence of FTAs in recent years eagerly sought by many 
countries as a more effective means of trade opening, which adopt a “WTO plus” orientation. 
That is to say, most of the FTAs signed in the 1990s and during the present decade follow 
the NAFTA model in terms of thematic coverage. These second-generation FTAs are more 
comprehensive in scope, not only because they are “broad” in terms of the geographic coverage of 
countries and regions and the number of sectors negotiated and incorporated, but also because of 
                                                     
27 Meanwhile, the current average levels and distributions of bilateral preferential rates among Latin American countries vis-à-vis the 
multilateral tariff rates also vary significantly across countries but fall into three basic categories. The first is marked not only by 
higher MFN tariffs, but also by a wider distribution of tariffs (Argentina, Brazil and Mexico). A second group has less overall 
dispersion and lower tariffs than the first group (Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela). A final group of countries 
(Bolivia, Chile and Peru) has, for the most part, uniform tariff structures. Estevadeordal (2002) indicates that, in a sense, the first 
grouping (which is “the most protectionist”) is at the same time the one that offers the highest margins of preference to the rest. The 
second group gives notable preferences to their internal trading partners, though not to the same extent. The preferential tariff 
structure of the last group preserves the uniformity principle in terms of lower dispersion with significant margins of preference as 
well. 
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the “depth” of the commitments they entail based on a “WTO-plus” focus in those sectors (see 
Table 5a). This is especially true for services, investment and intellectual property (Blanco and 
Zabludovsky 2003). These FTAs are, of course, not identical to NAFTA and take into 
consideration the specific interests of the relevant trading partner(s), thereby establishing a realistic 
agenda for the parties involved. However, it is important to point out that not only do all these 
FTAs share the philosophy and format of NAFTA but that some texts in certain disciplines are 
almost identical to those of NAFTA (Blanco and Zabludovsky 2003).28 These FTAs also introduce 
new approaches to older issues such as rules of origin, contingent measures for imports and dispute 
settlement. 
Figure 4 
COMPREHENSIVENESS OF RULES AND DISCIPLINES IN ECONOMIC COMPLEMENTATION 
AGREEMENTS (ECAS) SIGNED BY LAC COUNTRIES (AS OF FEBRUARY 2005) 















Source: Authors’ estimates based on ALADI (2005), and ECAs signed by the respective countries. 
 
It is important to note that the FTAA negotiations cover three areas (i.e., investment, 
competition policy and government procurement) that are commonly included in the second-
generation FTAs but are not integrated into multilateral negotiations. The areas that tend to be 
“WTO-plus” are precisely those sectors in which the countries of the region are generally weak in 
terms of institutional capacities or at an incipient stage in the formation and implementation of 
related regulations. In many cases, the countries are not quite ready to accept commitments whose 
economic and social impacts are not fully known or analyzed beforehand and that in many cases far 
outstrip their implementation capacities. 
                                                     
28 Although this also happens in the competition chapters of some agreements, there are other agreements that are close to the 
European Union’s model (2004). 














More developed, but no more than WTO
General mention of the matter
  














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































       
  


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































CEPAL − SERIE Comercio internacional N° 58 
 
35 
B. FTAA and other initiatives 
A comprehensive, balanced FTAA could improve market access, enhance the credibility of 
Latin America and the Caribbean and focus the attention of the United States more fully on the 
region, thereby boosting the countries’ standing at home as well as in overseas financial and 
investment markets. Within the FTAA framework, securing market access to the North is a central, 
strategic line of action and is the main objective of the countries of the region. For Latin America 
and the Caribbean, “effective market access will depend on the dismantling of existing barriers in 
the industrialized markets of the North; the existence of, and respect for, rules that ensure a secure 
and predictable environment in the application of contingent protection measures; the 
establishment of an efficient procedure for settling disputes; and the existence of mechanisms to 
ensure balanced outcomes in the operation of an agreement with 34 heterogeneous countries, some 
of which have limited institutional capacities” (IDB 2002, p.12). 
The WTO negotiations have had a strong influence on the FTAA process. Both of these 
negotiation processes are stuck on two major issues. The first is how far they will go in reducing 
government intervention in agricultural markets, and the second is the extent to which they will go 
beyond the traditional market-access issues and deal with such matters as “behind-the-border” 
issues. Regarding the first point, some countries of the hemisphere have argued that the FTAA 
negotiations should include discussions leading to the reduction of export subsidies in agricultural 
products, while others have countered that this subject should be left for the multilateral arena. 
More recently, MERCOSUR countries seem to have accepted this view and are trying to negotiate 
greater market access to the United States market and a closer agreement on the Singapore issues 
and on intellectual property. Some countries have maintained the original vision of the 34 countries 
in entering into the FTAA negotiations by eliminating most tariffs on goods and achieving deeper 
commitments on trade in services, while also including rules on new issues.29 This course of action 
would be complemented by progress towards far-reaching agricultural objectives in the Doha 
Round. However, the development of post-Cancun negotiations and the recent trends in the FTAA 
negotiations raise serious questions as to the scope of these simultaneous talks, which in theory 
should have been concluded by January 2005. 
It should be noted that the text of the 2003 FTAA Miami Ministerial Declaration was a sharp 
departure from the original plan of the San José Declaration, shifting from the ambition of a single 
undertaking across the nine negotiating areas to an agreement that allows for flexibility in the 
levels of commitment undertaken by each country in the various negotiating areas.30 Exactly what 
“the common sets of rights and obligations” mean and what the contents of any plurilateral 
agreements will be are questions that will have to await the outcome of further negotiations. 
In sum, differences on such issues as the dismantling of agricultural subsidies, services, 
investment and intellectual property rights led to a two-tiered approach (flexible geometry): a core 
agreement and more ambitious plurilateral agreements. These differences have played a part in the 
                                                     
29 There has emerged a group of 13 countries that support the general orientation of the United States in this respect. They are: Canada, 
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, and 
Peru. 
30 To translate the Miami agreement into a concrete mandate for the 9 FTAA negotiating groups, Blanco, Zabludovsky and Gómez 
(2004) argue that the major components of the “common set” for all 34 countries for each discipline must be specified, as well as 
the elements of the additional set of commitments that would be undertaken by countries that wish to do so. They stress that the 
success of a negotiation among two groups of countries with different levels of obligation depends strongly on finding a self-
contained balance within each of the two groups, and that as a minimum condition, FTAA participants should be willing to 
liberalize trade in goods and consolidate current levels of openness in services and investment, with clear rules and transparency 
among the 34 Member countries. 
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present paralysis of FTAA negotiations. The so-called “core agreement” is yet to be defined and 
negotiated. This situation has contributed to the proliferation of BTAs. 
On the other hand, for many countries in South America, Europe is as important a trading 
partner as the United States and Canada combined. A number of sub-regions would stand to benefit 
as much from trade and investment liberalization in the European Union as from FTAA 
(Monteaguado and Watanuki 2003). One of the reasons why Mexico pursued an agreement with 
the European Union despite its already strong dependence on the United States markets was 
precisely to minimize residual trade diversion, diversify its export markets, and attract European 
FDI and know-how. For Chile, the FTA with the European Union is meant to consolidate its market 
diversification process, in which the European Union represents roughly 25% of its total exports. 
The European Union’s negotiations with MERCOSUR are highly dependent on the trade-offs 
between agricultural liberalization and improvements in market access for manufactures and 
services for European Union exporters. Meanwhile, intra-MERCOSUR trade may suffer some 
setbacks, especially in relation to several types of manufactured goods in which the European 
Union has a comparative advantage (ALADI 2003). Overall benefits for the Latin American and 
Caribbean countries are highly dependent on the extent of market access that these countries obtain 
in European agricultural markets. Progress in these talks and prospects for launching European 
Union-Central America and European Union-Andean Community negotiations would appear to 
hinge upon eventual Doha Round agreements. CARICOM may finalize an FTA with the European 
Union before 2008. Given a different product mix in exports to the European Union, Latin America 
and the Caribbean would not be competing directly with the 10 Central and Eastern European 
countries that recently joined the Union in these markets. However, the Latin American and 
Caribbean countries will mostly likely suffer significant trade diversion in agriculture as a result of 
their accession (Nogués 2004). 
In addition to moving forward with negotiations for FTAA and with the European Union, it 
is equally important for the Latin American and Caribbean region to continue to strengthen trade 
and investment relations with Asia and the Pacific. At present, the Asian-Pacific markets are still 
underexploited, as they represent no more than about 10% of total Latin American and Caribbean 
trade, although they are already significant markets for Chile and Peru. Rapidly growing exports to 
China also represent a great potential for further growth for a number of countries in the region. 
Other FTAs that follow in the footsteps of the FTAs signed by Chile with the Republic of Korea 
and by Mexico with Japan may provide a means of reducing high tariffs, tariff escalation and non-
trade barriers such as quotas, seasonal tariffs, technical barriers to trade, and sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures in Asian markets. Multilateral liberalization is still the most efficient way 
to reduce the high levels of protection found in the agricultural sectors of these Asian markets, 
however. 
C. Subregional integration and bilateral agreements 
By their very nature, RTAs divert trade by affording preferential treatment to member 
countries that is unavailable to non-members. The concurrent existence of an FTAA and sub-
regional or bilateral agreements with countries in and outside the region will surely increase the 
complexity and reduce the transparency of the multilateral trading system. In addition, in some 
sectors that enjoy a high level of protection under sub-regional agreements, such as the automotive 
industry, protectionist barriers would be slow to be eliminated within the context of the multilateral 
trading system or FTAA. From this perspective, making the rules more compatible across sub-
regional agreements and between these agreements and WTO might lessen the negative effects 
associated with having myriad FTAs of differing depths and scope. This takes quite some time to 
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accomplish, however, and a WTO-consistent FTAA that would convert sub-regional agreements 
into more open blocs seems rather remote at this juncture.  
However, in some cases, FTA coordination facilitates convergence and promotes 
compatibility with regional and multilateral agreements. It may be possible to pursue a multi-track 
strategy of multilateral, regional and bilateral aspects that might lead to free and fair trade more 
quickly than would be possible using just one track. The proposed FTAA, regardless of the form 
that it might take, can benefit from using multilateral disciplines as a foundation for hemispheric 
trade. At the same time, the adoption of hemispheric agreements on areas not covered by 
multilateral rules and disciplines could help promote consensus-building on these issues at the 
multilateral level. Where adequate multilateral disciplines and mechanisms exist, they could be 
incorporated into FTAA, thereby avoiding duplication or renegotiations at the hemispheric level. 
Moreover, the Latin American and Caribbean countries should avoid focusing their negotiating 
energies on onerous “WTO-plus” policies rather than searching for less demanding basic 
commitments and commonalities at the multilateral level.31  
Despite several potential drawbacks, regional integration can foster a diversification of 
exports towards output that is more connected to the overall competitiveness of the economies 
concerned and that therefore helps to create dynamic comparative advantages. In addition, 
integration serves to “lock-in” improved access to regional markets and thus fosters economies of 
scale. It can also enhance non-traditional exports, differentiated products and products involving 
more value added and more knowledge-intensity (ECLAC 2002, Devlin and Ffrench Davis 1998). 
In fact, the learning curve associated with experience in regional markets can give rise to a platform 
for new international markets. This is the principal idea underlying the ECLAC proposal regarding 
Open Regionalism (ECLAC 1994).  
In this respect, much remains to be done if the Latin American and Caribbean region is to 
exploit the potential benefits of regional integration more fully. The countries in the region should 
continue to work to overcome the constraints affecting their regional integration process. These 
constraints include: (i) the persistence of non-tariff barriers; (ii) perforations of common external 
tariffs and failure to bring customs union arrangements to completion;32 (iii) inadequate regional 
infrastructure; (iv) lack of effective sub-regional community institutions; (v) limited coordination 
of macroeconomic and sector policies, as well as tax systems that do not work properly in 
integrated markets and that fail to stimulate external trade and investment; vi) weak Dispute 
Settlement Mechanisms; and vii) insufficient mechanisms for promoting a form of socio-economic 
development that would compensate for asymmetries in the distribution of the benefits of 
integration (IDB 2003; ECLAC 2005). The modernization and simplification of customs 
procedures, the regionalization of rules of origin, sanitary and phytosanitary regulations, the 
strengthening of sub-regional dispute settlement mechanisms and the building of institutional and 
                                                     
31 As Granados (1999) suggests, there are some areas that are prone to the generation of “cross-fertilization” effects between WTO and 
FTAA in terms of complementarity and convergence, while other areas will act more as an “interaction obstruction” force between 
the two processes. Of course, agriculture is the area that has the most “cross-fertilization” potential. In his view, there are some areas 
in which FTAA would lead the process in establishing the global norm, such as investment, services and government procurement, 
while the multilateral process could establish the general rule for dispute settlement mechanisms, for instance. Meanwhile, 
incorporating rules and disciplines in FTAA that go much further than the sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures and technical 
barriers to trade (TBT) of WTO is unlikely to occur, although there could be some “cross-fertilization” in relation to transparency, 
notifications, risk analysis and scientific evidence. 
32 In the event that FTAA ends up being a shallow, much less ambitious arrangement, subregional agreements could play a larger role 
in raising the level of economic and social well-being in the countries of the region. This is especially true if the goals of Latin 
American and Caribbean integration schemes regarding the establishment of customs unions and common markets are fully met. 
Moreover, within the context of a complete customs union, once agreement has been reached on the implementation of a common 
external tariff, the conclusion of bilateral deals with third parties by individual members of the union should be avoided. Regardless 
of the success and scope of FTAA, subregions with common market tariffs should continue to lower their external tariffs, which, 
while benefiting all members, will be of particular importance for the smaller countries that are more exposed to the unwanted 
effects of trade diversion (IDB, 2002, p.16). 
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human capacities in matters related to certification/verification, technical barriers and sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures would also be important elements of the relevant regional public goods 
(ECLAC 2002). The new agendas of MERCOSUR and the Andean Community (the 2006 
Objective and the Quirama Declaration of 2003, respectively) take the majority of the above-
mentioned issues into account and seek to remove existing obstacles to sub-regional trade and 
investment flows. In sum, regional integration should tackle several dimensions of “deep 
integration” in a context of “Open Regionalism” by addressing “behind-the-border” measures while 
also harmonizing regulatory regimes. In addition, this approach to integration requires the adoption 
of agreements that will contribute to macroeconomic stability and productive development in each 
country. 
If principal economic actors such as exporters, importers and investors believe that one of 
the main weaknesses of integration schemes is legal uncertainty that surround them, it is of great 
importance to create a credible trade and investment environment. In this respect, it is important for 
the region to make efforts towards harmonization, and eventually unification, of the heterogeneous 
dispute solution systems that exist in the four sub-regional schemes, with the possibility of that 
those mechanisms of all the ECAs and BTAs signed by Chile and Mexico being gradually 
integrated into this single regional controversy-solution body. Moving towards a single dispute 
settlement mechanism, that should make its ruling more binding and facilitate the learning from the 
best practices of each sub-regional entity, would be conducive to a more credible and predictable 
legal system even at the national level. The same “regionalization” process can be envisaged for 
other rules and disciplines such as pytosanitary and sanitary, technical measures, and the rules of 
origin that would permit to “accumulate” value at the regional level.  
A strong sub-regional agreement would provide enhanced negotiating power both at the level 
of WTO and in connection with the European Union and FTAA negotiations. Even with a full-
fledged FTAA, a sub-region that has achieved a common market or beyond, with free movement of 
factors and other forms of economic cooperation, could combine national resources more 
effectively to compete within FTAA and in the global economy (IDB, 2002, p.14). Deeper sub-
regional agreements would also promote other beneficial forms of cooperation, such as 
macroeconomic policy coordination, integration of infrastructure or the provision of regional 
public goods (ECLAC 2002, Kuwayama 2005). For instance, macroeconomic policy coordination 
is more likely to succeed in a regional setting than in the FTAA framework, although 
macroeconomic performance is one of the areas that cannot be solved through FTAs. Rather, the 
responsibility lies with domestic policy (Machinea 2003b).  
Nevertheless, since the mid-1990s, instead of deepening regional agreements, the region has 
opted to pursue the bilateral route. This increased tendency to pursue BTAs parallel to the FTAA 
negotiations —as reflected, for example, in the recent interest shown by the United States in 
initiating and/or concluding bilateral FTAs with Chile, Central America, the Andean Community 
and others— poses potential risks for a comprehensive and balanced WTO agreement and FTAA.  
The advance of hub-and-spoke regionalism in the western hemisphere has been rapid despite 
the recognition that preferences obtained through BTAs may be gradually perforated and diluted by 
other PTAs over time. The pursuit of an FTAA based on hub-and-spoke bilateral agreements poses 
new challenges: this approach “could be geared primarily to achieving the country’s narrow 
commercial interests through sheer leverage in the bilateral negotiations —or through inclusion in 
some of them of issues that may not entail important concessions for the bilateral counterpart— 
and then using them as precedents to forge similar FTAA agreements. In this way, the agenda setter 
would obtain an agreement that is closer to meeting its own goals, without having to make many 
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concessions in return” (IDB 2002, p.13). These strategies could stifle the formation of a balanced 
FTAA and have a negative effect on economic and social welfare.33  
It is important to take note of several aspects of these BTAs with industrialized countries. 
First, they tend to establish and consolidate the access that the Latin American and Caribbean 
countries already have through the GSP. Secondly, these FTAs include provisions in investment, 
competition policy, government procurement and trade facilitation that are of special interest to 
industrialized countries that have “WTO-plus” disciplines for which there are no multilateral rules 
in place (see the following section). Thirdly, issues that affect Latin American signatories, such as 
internal support measures in agriculture or anti-dumping legislation, are remitted to the multilateral 
negotiating forum.  
In summing up, bilateral agreements improve market access, consolidate and expand trade 
preferences, establish mutual rights and obligations (dispute settlement mechanisms), lock-in 
liberalization efforts and may favor institutional modernization. Nevertheless, multiple bilateral 
agreements do have some costs: intraregional trade diversion, administrative costs (the “spaghetti 
bowl”), reduced bargaining power for smaller countries, the possibility that some countries will 
agree to certain demands in areas that go beyond commonly accepted trade issues, etc. They also 
reduce incentives for pushing the regional envelope and the willingness of the developed world to 
push multilateral negotiations. Furthermore, it should be kept in mind that FTAs (and FTAA) are 
an opportunity, but they are no more of a “panacea” than the structural reforms of the 1990s were.  
A comprehensive FTAA could be a superior form of regionalism for Latin America and the 
Caribbean if it concentrates more on trade barriers and less on non-trade issues. Too strong an 
emphasis on “behind-the-border” issues reduces the scope for policy measures less than what was 
the case in the development process of today’s industrialized countries or the newly industrialized 
economies. This is the case of provisions that impede regulatory measures on capital inflows, for 
instance. 
D. Agriculture and “WTO-plus” issues in FTAs 
The existing and forthcoming BTAs, especially those with the North that tend to adopt the 
“WTO-plus” approach, basically involve a trade-off between market access to the North’s huge 
goods and financial markets and the South’s liberalized markets for imports, services, investment 
and intellectual property rights. This, in turn, reduces the ability of the Latin American and 
Caribbean countries to maneuver their already limited autonomy in trade and development policy. 
It should also be remembered that the BTAs with industrial countries include disciplines in 
investment, competition policy, government procurement and trade facilitation, for which there are 
no multilateral rules. As this type of FTA proliferates, it is important to understand the potential 
short- and long-term benefits and costs of such arrangements. Given their depth and scope, it is 
difficult to ensure that norms developed at WTO can be easily built into bilateral agreements. 
However, this would not necessarily be the case at the regional level. The relationship between 
WTO and regional agreements is a realm where coherence could be sought as a means of ensuring 
that there will be room for development policy, as opposed to the limited scope for policy measures 
available under the “WTO-plus” approach. 
In the following pages, the scope and depth of Latin American FTAs are examined in five 
areas of negotiation (agriculture, services, investment, rules of origin and competition policy) in 
                                                     
33 The Santiago Declaration repeats the Declaration of the IV Ministerial Meeting on Trade in San José, Costa Rica stipulating that 
FTAA can co-exist with bilateral and sub-regional agreements to the extent that the rights and obligations under these agreements 
are not covered by or go beyond the rights and obligations of FTAA (building blocks approach); and that FTAA should be 
constructed based on commitments that are balanced, equitable and advantageous for each of the members. 
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order to show how rigorous these FTAs are in the latter three negotiation sectors than in the former 
with respect to their rules and disciplines, in comparison to those of WTO. Although not dealt with 
here due to space limitations, a similar case can be made for the region in regard to intellectual 
property rights (Vivas-Eugui 2003) None of these areas is not covered by a complete set of WTO 
rules and standards, while such norms are increasingly being incorporated into the recent FTAs. 
1. Agriculture 
A detailed review of agriculture-related provisions in FTAs signed by Latin American 
countries, that had entered into force before the end of 200434 (Kjöllerström 2005) indicates that 
the special status, and thus treatment, conferred to agriculture in the WTO, is widely reproduced in 
the regional sphere. However, in contrast to those in other negotiating sectors, major agriculture-
related provisions contained in the FTAs are not by any means “WTO-plus” disciplines. 
Table 5 
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS MOST FREQUENTLY EXCLUDED FROM TARIFF LIBERALIZATIONa IN 
FTAS SIGNED BY LAC COUNTRIES 
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Source: Kjöllerström, Mónica (2005), “The Special Status of Agriculture in Latin American Free Trade Agreements”, 
mimeo, ECLAC, Santiago, Chile. Compilation follow text of the agreements, downloadable from the Foreign Trade 
Information System of the Organization of American States, OAS-SICE (http://www.sice.oas.org/).  
a Two agreements that only recently entered into force (Mexico-Uruguay and Panama-Taiwan Province of China) have 
not been studied here. In addition, the Israel-Mexico, Chile-EFTA and Mexico-EFTA are not considered given that they 
consist mainly of permanent tariff reductions and a short list of agricultural products for which trade is fully liberalized. 
b Excluded only by the EU, but with the concession of a duty-free quota to Chile. 
c Excluded by South Korea pending Doha round negotiations; 
d Note that the Central America-Dom. Republic FTA is not in force yet for Nicaragua and that the Central America-
Chile FTA is only in force for Costa Rica and El Salvador. 
 
With respect to product coverage, as in the multilateral forum, more products tend to be 
excluded altogether from trade liberalization in the agricultural sector than in other sectors. Sugar, 
dairy products, cereals and meats are the most common exclusions. Many of these products are 
                                                     
34 In this analysis, the CAFTA-Dominican Republic agreement is also considered. The ECAs signed within the scope of ALADI that 
are not FTAs in strict rigor have not been reviewed. Such ECAs are less ambitious in terms of both scope (issues covered) and 
product coverage. These include: Chile-Venezuela (ECA 23), Chile-Colombia (ECA 24), Chile-Ecuador (ECA 32), MERCOSUR-
Chile (ECA 35), MERCOSUR-Bolivia (ECA 36) and Chile-Peru (ECA 38).  
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either “sensitive” or “special” as defined in the multilateral negotiations, for the reasons either of 
food security, livelihood security or rural development.35 In addition, tariff reduction/elimination 
schedules for agricultural goods tend to be longer than for other sectors.36 Furthermore, for most 
agricultural goods that receive some kind of preferential treatment, the tariff reduction with respect 
to the pre-FTA level is rather small (see Table 5). 
Despite these generalities, the FTAs vary substantially with respect to the product coverage 
and tariff reduction/elimination schedules, and in the opinion of Kjöllerström (2004), they can 
roughly be divided into four categories (see Figure 3). In the first group of countries, the Chile-
United States agreement stands out because no product is excluded from the tariff elimination 
schedule, and because applied tariffs are reciprocally and completely eliminated for the majority of 
agricultural goods either immediately or in the short-run. In the Chile-Mexico and G3 agreements, 
although a few products considered “sensitive” are excluded, tariffs on the remaining agricultural 
goods are eliminated upon entry into force of the agreement.  
Figure 5 
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Source: Kjöllerström, Mónica (2005), “The Special Status of Agriculture in Latin American 
Free Trade Agreements”, mimeo, ECLAC, Santiago, Chile. 
 
                                                     
35 For instance, in the Bolivia-Mexico FTA, almost 100% of the products excluded are agricultural goods, and in the G3 agreement, 
the percentage is similarly high regarding the Mexico-Colombia tariff schedules, 90% - although much smaller for Mexico-
Venezuela (approximately 30%; here the exclusions are concentrated in the textile sector, which accounts for 70% of the total 
number of excluded products). The same holds for the Chile-Mexico FTA (almost 80%). 
36 In the case of the agreements signed by the EU with Mexico and Chile, for instance, the average phase-out period for all the sectors 
is 1.71 and 1.14 years, respectively, versus 5.09 and 3.78 years in the case of agricultural goods. In the Bolivia-Mexico FTA, 
agricultural goods represent 78.9% (100%) of the products with longest phase-out periods (10 and 15 years, respectively). In the 
association agreements between Bolivia and Chile with MERCOSUR, in force since 1997 and 1996, respectively, agricultural goods 
with tariff phase-out until 2006 and 2011 and later, represent 0% and 16.0%, 49.4% and 5 7.6% and 100% and 100%, of all 
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A second group of trade agreements have a short list of exclusions, but relatively long tariff 
elimination schedules for some sensitive products, as in NAFTA, CAFTA-Dominican Republic 
(CAFTA-DR) and the Mexico-Nicaragua agreements. The agreement between Chile-Republic of 
Korea is rather unique in that Chile has limited its list of exclusions to the products subject to price 
bands (wheat, vegetable oils, sugar) while the Asian country postponed the negotiation of a 
significant number of goods pending the outcome of the Doha round negotiations, although its 
formal list of exclusions is also limited to a few products. 
The third group shows a relatively large number of agricultural goods excluded altogether 
from any concessions (or that remain with large above-quota duties), and the remainder are for the 
most part liberalized either in the medium or long-run, usually with large grace periods. Such is the 
case of Canada-Costa Rica, Costa Rica-Mexico); Mexico-Northern Triangle and Chile-EU. The last 
group lists those FTAs whose commitments in agricultural goods are “fairly modest”, excluding 
many products and consisting mainly of permanent tariff reductions.  
The factors explaining the heterogeneity between the examined FTAs include, among others: 
(i) cross seasonality between the North and South hemispheres that reduces competition in certain 
products (e.g., Chile and the United States versus Mexico and the European Union); (ii) unilateral 
liberalization on the part of some countries as part of extensive structural reforms (such as Chile) 
which have made these countries more prone to seek further liberalization covering multiple 
aspects of bilateral relations beyond trade (e.g., investment); and (iii) the relative importance of 
some products in terms of their contribution to internal production, employment, and total exports. 
In some cases, the asymmetry in the level of development between signatory countries has been 
taken into account, by establishing, for instance, longer tariff elimination schedules for the less-
developed party, or allowing certain products considered important in terms of food security to be 
excluded non-reciprocally.37 
Regarding export subsidies, most agreements establish their elimination on reciprocal trade, 
but the products excluded from tariff liberalization are also excluded from this obligation. 
Moreover, countries are allowed to reintroduce such subsidies if the counterpart is importing 
subsidized similar goods from third parties. At the same time, the commitments with respect to 
domestic support measures and anti-dumping remedies are basically inexistent. Besides, a group of 
FTAs include special safeguard (SSGs) measures for an extensive list of products. In some cases, 
the conditions governing the SSG application are more flexible than what the WTO Agreement on 
Agriculture establishes.38 Moreover, in some agreements it is specifically stated that one or more 
Parties have the right to maintain their band price mechanisms. In addition, the agroindustrial 
sector, together with textiles and apparel, has also the strictest rules of origin in all agreements 
considered, and the most exceptions with respect to the so-called “de minimis” rule (tolerated 
percentage of imported inputs when these are not allowed). 
                                                     
37  This is the case of Mexico, in NAFTA and the agreement with the EU; of Nicaragua, in the agreement with Mexico; of Costa Rica, 
in the agreement with Canada; and of the Central American countries in CAFTA. For example, while Canada liberalized trade with 
Costa Rica for 87% of its agricultural goods upon entry into force of the agreement (that is except refined sugar, which is liberalized 
in 8 years, and the list of exceptions), the latter does so for only 45% of its agricultural goods. In addition, only 8% are liberalized in 
the medium-term (7 years) and the remainder, 36%, only in the long-term (14 years) (Ministerio de Comercio Exterior de Costa 
Rica, 2001). 
38 For instance, Chile would not in principle be allowed to apply such measures given that it has “not reserved the right to do so in its 
schedule of commitments on agriculture”. However, this is possible in the context of the FTA with the United States. In the case of 
the Andean Community (CAN), the application of SSGs “can be prolonged indefinitely, and under any form, as tariff or non-tariff 
measures”. In fact, the obligation to provide non-discriminatory treatment to CAN members with respect to third countries would be 
the only thing preventing the latter from receiving a more favorable treatment. Safeguards can now be imposed in 85 tariff lines, 
which represent a significant proportion of the agricultural trade within customs union members. Overall, the “SSGs in the CAN are 
significantly more restrictive than those of the Chile-United States agreement, and thus the possibility that an agreement between the 
Andean countries and the United States is reached would severely limit the former” (Secretaría General de la Comunidad Andina, 
2003, p.16). 
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On the other hand, the provisions on intellectual property are in some cases stricter than what 
has been agreed multilaterally (for instance, with respect to protection of geographical indications 
in the agreements where the European Union is a Party; or with respect to the patenting of plants 
and second use of agrochemicals in CAFTA-DR). The reverse is also true, as happens with the 
exceptions to the protection of geographical indications, which are broader than the TRIPS 
provisions in the agreements where the United States is a Party. Notwithstanding, in some cases 
some steps have been taken towards trade facilitation in the areas of sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures and agricultural standards, by the establishment of clear rules in their application between 
FTA members. 
2. Services 
A major difference between WTO and the sub-regional negotiations being pursued in the 
western hemisphere on trade in services is that the former follows the “positive-list” approach 
while the latter has preferred the negative-list option (Prieto and Stephenson 1998; Stephenson 
2001). The positive-list method was agreed on and applied during the Uruguay Round and is 
established at the multilateral level under GATS. Points of emphasis of GATS include the creation 
of commitments in market access and treatment of foreign providers in specific service sectors. 
Periodic rounds of negotiations have served to add liberalization measures in sectors not originally 
considered. In contrast, most of the FTAs signed by the Latin American and Caribbean countries 
are based on the “negative list” approach that was first pioneered in NAFTA. This method commits 
the members to liberalize all forms of discriminatory treatment faced by all service sectors, with the 
exception of certain sectors and measures that are clearly identified in accompanying reservations.  
Another differentiating element is the local presence provision that is contained in the 
majority of FTAs signed by the countries of the region. This provision prohibits any party in a 
given agreement from requiring a foreign services provider to establish itself locally in order to 
supply a traded service. This “right of non-establishment” is harmonized within these NAFTA-type 
agreements.39 In sum, some areas of divergence exist among the bilateral and subregional 
agreements on trade in services that have been concluded. However, the scope of these agreements 
tends to be similar to that of NAFTA, and a foundationally compatible relationship thus exists 
between this agreement and those signed by the countries in the region (see Table 6). Meanwhile, 
the FTAs signed with the European Union tend to be less demanding in terms of their commitments 
and disciplines. 
Speaking specifically of the BTAs singed by the United States, Abugattas (2004) argues that 
services disciplines under the proliferating US BTAs with Latin American countries exceed GATS 
requirements in certain areas, while they go less far in others, resulting in a considerably less 
development-friendly regime than the one offered under the WTO. In principle, RTAs and BTAs 
should go beyond the obligations contained in the GATS, and address those areas where 
multilateral experience has revealed the need for improvement or clarification. However, his 
analysis of the services provisions in the BTAs, which are modeled after the NAFTA, indicates that 
these conditions have not necessarily been fulfilled.  
                                                     
39  Other similarities with NAFTA-type pacts in trade in services include: (i) the similar coverage of sectors, for which substantive 
provisions are established that have very few specific exceptions, (ii) the importance of the two principles in trade in services of 
MFN treatment and national treatment, together with the even more important principle of transparency; (iii) the lack of any 
stipulation on subsidy disciplines in the NAFTA-like agreements; (iv) the lack of any stipulation on the possibility for general 
safeguard action with respect to services, though this is found in the GATS (however, safeguard action in the case of balance-of-
payments difficulties is foreseen in most agreements, including NAFTA, the Group of Three, the Andean Community and the 
agreement reached by Central America with the Dominican Republic; the bilateral treaties signed by Mexico with Bolivia, Costa 
Rica and Nicaragua specify that procedures for the establishment of disciplines on safeguards will be developed); (v) their 
disciplines on monopoly service providers are designed to ensure that monopoly suppliers do not abuse their position in the market 
or perform actions inconsistent with the WTO guidelines accepted by a member (State-owned enterprises are also included in these 
advanced agreements); and (vi) provisions on the relationship between services and investment. 
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Table 6 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS 
IN TRADE IN SERVICES 
Agreement  APPROACH Trade in Services 
Temporal entry of 
business persons  
Professional 
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Protocol de 
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 Free Trade Agreements (bilaterals and plurilterals)  
Bolivia-Mexico Negative List 
(1995) 
Chapter 9 Chapter 11 
Annex al 
Chapter 9 
Chapter 10 Chapter 12 ... ... ... 
Chile–Canada Negative List 
(1997) 
Chapter H  Chapter K  
Annex al 
Chapter H  
Chapter I  ... ... ... ... 
Chile–USA Negative List 
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Chile – Korea Negative List 
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Chapter 11 Chapter 14 
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Chapter 10 Chapter 11 
Annex al 
Chapter 10 
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 Chapter 13 
(does not apply between 
Panama and Costa 
Rica) 
Chapter 12 ... ... Annex 11.16 
Chile-Mexico  Negative List 
(1998) 
Chapter 10 Chapter 13 
Annex al 
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Chapter 9 Chapter 10 
Annex al 
Chapter 9 
... ... ... ... ... 
Group of Three Negative List 
(1995 
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Mexico-Nicaragua Negative List 
(1998) 
Chapter 10 Chapter 12 
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Chapter 12 Chapter 11 ... ... 
Annex al 
Chapter 10 
Mexico - EU Positive List 
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Annex al 
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Annex al 
Chapter 12  
Source: ECLAC, International Trade and Integration Division, based on the legal instruments signed by the respective 
countries: The information for the majority of the agreements is available online on the website of the Organization of 
American States (OAS) (www.sice.oas.org). In the case of the agreement between the Central American countries 
(Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and El Salvador) with the USA, consulted the following draft reports available 
online:http://www.unes.org.sv/unes/capitulo10.pdf; and http://www.ustr.gov/new/fta/Cafta/text/index.htm  
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The BTAs concluded to date reflect the US trade interests especially in areas such as 
financial services, telecommunications, express delivery, the protection of local distributors and 
transparency. In other areas, however, the BTAs either for the most part duplicate existing 
obligations under the GATS or are even more restricted in scope. 
Such is the case, for instance, for ‘temporary movement of natural persons’ (Mode 4). The 
GATS covers all kinds of movement and all categories of providers with no reference to their level 
of qualification; under Mode 4, WTO Members commit to temporarily admitting into their territory 
citizens of other Member countries —and, under certain circumstances, permanent residents in 
other Member countries— to provide services to both natural persons and legal entities in the 
receiving country. The GATS neither defines the meaning of ‘temporality’ nor imposes any 
conditions as to how the ‘movement’ must take place. Latin American countries have prioritized 
this mode of services supply in their requests in the WTO’s services negotiations (Abugattas 2004). 
The US agreements with Chile and Singapore which contain a chapter on the temporary movement 
of businesspersons, and professionals40 may be an exception in this area, since the US Congress 
clearly indicated that it would not accept similar concessions in future agreements.41 
Another area of trade in services that deserves attention is domestic regulation. The BTAs 
limit the breadth of obligations to that specified in GATS Article VI.4, excluding the requirement 
of the first paragraph in that article, which requires all measures of general application affecting in 
trade in services to be “administered in a reasonable, objective and impartial manner.” This occurs 
due to the definition of investment in the BTAs that goes far beyond GATS provisions on 
“commercial establishment” extending commitments pertaining to domestic regulation to the broad 
spectrum of investment measures. 
3. Investment 
There is no comprehensive agreement on investment within the WTO framework. The scope 
of arrangements in this area is primarily confined to performance requirements in the TRIMs for 
goods and the provisions of the GATS concerning commercial presence (Mode 3) and movement 
of natural persons (Mode 4) for the supply of services. In parallel to these commitments at WTO, to 
promote a marked increase in FDI flows, during the 1990s the countries negotiated a large number 
of bilateral investment treaties (BITs). These treaties are officially called Investment Promotion 
and Protection Agreements (IPPAs) and Agreements on Double Taxation. These investment 
agreements set standards for the treatment and protection of investment and investors; they include 
an admission clause that refers to the laws and regulations of the host State concerning the 
admission of investment and provide a dispute settlement mechanism for arbitrating disagreements 
between the investor and the host State. The Latin American and Caribbean countries were 
reported to have concluded more than 400 BITs and 260 double taxation treaties by the end of 
2003. Among those, Chile has signed 61 BTI agreements up to November 2005 
(http:/www/direcon.cl/). In the case of the FTAs signed by Chile until now, with the exception of 
the lately P-4 signed with New Zealand, Singapore and Brunei Darussalam, investment is included 
in the main text, and the norm seems to be the inclusion of BIT disciplines in FTAs. Because of the 
                                                     
40 The United States gave Chile a quota of 1,400 professional entries and granted access to 5,400 service providers from Singapore. 
41 Another example that Abugattas (2004) illustrates is the definition of ‘consumption abroad’ (Mode 2) in the BTAs signed by the 
United States that differs from the one contained in the GATS Article I. The formulation incorporated in the BTAs limits the scope 
of Mode 2 to only those transactions between a consumer in one Party and a provider of the Party in whose territory the service is 
offered. In the case of the BTAs, Mode 2 is defined as the supply of a service “in the territory of one Party by persons of this Party to 
persons of the other Party”, whereas Mode 2 under the GATS contains no specifications for the provider of services to persons of 
another party. Therefore, what is excluded from the reach of Mode 2 in the BTAs but is included in Mode 2 of GATS is the supply 
of a service to consumer of Party (A) in the territory of the other Party (B) through a temporal presence of natural persons of another 
Party in whose territory the service is offered. This problem derives in part from that the chapter on services which does not include 
the supply of a service in the territory of one Party by an investor of another Party. 
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inclusion that removes all restrictions on business and provides more certainty to foreign investors, 
FTAs act as an open “market access” for investment.  
Since the 1990s an increasing number of countries in the Americas have concluded 
agreements that go beyond the traditional approach based on protection and promotion by including 
a “market access” dimension mentioned before. These NAFTA and NAFTA-like agreements are 
specifically designed for the twofold purpose of achieving a high level of investment protection 
while also ensuring the free entry of investments and investors into the territory of the host country. 
This is achieved by adding a “right of establishment” for foreign investors and investments.42 
In the context of agreements on investment, the FTAA member countries can be divided into 
four groups. The first group consists of those that have signed IPPAs with the United States (e.g., 
Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago) and of those that 
have signed an individual investment chapter within their FTAs. Main similarities and differences 
in the treatment of investment across different FTAs existing in the region are illustrated in table 7. 
It is important to note that, even though they may take the form of IPPAs, all the agreements signed 
with the United States follow a format similar to that of Chapter 11 of NAFTA and incorporate 
many rigorous features (see Note No. 43 of this paper). The above countries, as well as Mexico, 
Canada, Chile, the Central American countries, Panama and the Dominican Republic, all of which 
have signed an FTA with the United States, might not have a problem in accepting a chapter similar 
to this in FTAA. The second group consists of the countries that have signed a NAFTA-type 
agreement, but not with the United States (e.g., Colombia and Venezuela). The third group consists 
of countries that have signed agreements of the IPPA category (e.g., Barbados, Brazil, Dominican 
Republic, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay) without mimicking the NAFTA model. It should be also 
mentioned that in the case of MERCOSUR and the Andean Community, each has its proper 
provisions on investment, which are relatively broad in their scope but are less ambitious with 
respect to international dispute arbitration. It is also interesting to note that in the case of 
CARICOM-Dominican Republic agreement, the parties agreed to include a clause allowing for the 
postponement of profit repatriation for foreign investment for at least three years, should the host 
country face balance-of-payments problems. 
                                                     
42 These NAFTA-like agreements, whose disciplines are strict and coverage is wide, can be characterized by the following features: (i) 
a “broad, open-ended, asset-based” definition of investment, though some agreements try to avoid specific monetary and speculative 
flows that are not related to investments; (ii) the inclusion of a right of establishment (right to establish a new business or to acquire 
an existing one) with no admission provision but with a list of country-specific exceptions; (iii) strict disciplines on non-
discrimination, --pre- and post investment stages,-- national treatment, MFN; (iv) prohibition of  performance requirements for both 
goods and services which go far beyond the multilateral commitments under the TRIMs; (iv) freedom of payments and free transfer 
of funds; v) strict conditions for expropriation and guarantees for investors and adequate compensation if an expropriation were to 
ever occur; (vi) disciplines that prohibit the relaxation of internal environmental standards aimed at investment promotion; (vi) an 
investor-state dispute settlement process (Robert 2001, Blanco and Zabludovsky 2003). The rest of the investment agreements 
existing in the Americas are less ambitious: their disciplines incorporate internal legislation that has a discriminatory character, 
referring, for instance, only to the post-establishment stage, and direct investment. The latter do not prohibit the application of 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Similar Chapter XI NAFTA 
Similar Chapter XI NAFTA 
Similar Chapter XI NAFTA 
Similar Chapter XI NAFTA 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































CEPAL − SERIE Comercio internacional N° 58 
 
49 
The last group is comprised of those countries that have not signed any investment 
agreement (Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Belize, Dominica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent 
and the Grenadines, Saint Lucia and Suriname (Blanco and Zabludvsky 2003). 
4. Rules of origin (RoO) 
Conceptually, there are two basic criteria that determine origin. With the criterion of “wholly 
obtained or produced”, as in the case of commodities and related products which have been entirely 
grown, extracted from the soil or harvested within the country, only one country enters into 
consideration in attributing origin. Most countries have adopted the precise definition contained in 
the Kyoto Convention for this criterion. The same convention does not, however, provide a single 
approach for defining the other criterion, “substantial transformation”, where two or more countries 
have taken part in the production process. It should be noted that WTO has not yet developed 
binding multilateral rules of origin. One of the goals underlying the NAFTA negotiations on rules 
of origin was to develop specific criteria to give more precision to this concept. 
In addition to the “wholly obtained or produced” criterion, there are three other rules-of-
origin methods provided for in NAFTA: (i) changes in tariff classification; (ii) domestic content 
rules or regional value added; and iii) technical requirements. These three methods are used with 
different degrees of precision under different FTAs. In the old agreements signed by the countries 
in the western hemisphere, mostly under the LAIA framework, the general rule, applied across-the-
board, is based on a change in tariff classification at the heading level or, alternatively, a regional 
value-added rule of at least 50% of the f.o.b. export value. At the other extreme, there is the type of 
rules of origin negotiated under NAFTA, which incorporates a general rule plus additional specific 
rules negotiated at the product level that combine the above three methods in many different ways. 
An intermediate group with a lower degree of specificity includes the United States-Canada FTA, 
the Group of Three agreement, Mexico’s bilateral agreements with Costa Rica and Bolivia, Chile’s 
FTAs with Mexico and Canada, and the rules of origin applying under the MERCOSUR bilaterals 
with Chile and Bolivia, as well as CACM (Izam 2003).  
In sum, the proliferation of PTAs, each with quite different and restrictive rules of origin, 
diverts trade and undermines the trade-creating potential of these agreements (Estevadeordal and 
Suominen 2003). PTAs have their own rules of origin, whose characteristics are increasingly 
complex and specific, making them difficult to harmonize. Additionally, there are a series of 
difficulties in arriving at a single multilateral system of rules of origin on non-preferential trade in 
goods within the WTO framework. Therefore, it does not seem reasonable to expect, at least in the 
short run, the emergence of a multilateral system of rules of origin for international trade under the 
MFN clause, and the harmonization of the rules of origin for preferential trade in goods appears 
even less likely. 
5. Competition policy 
Diverse anti-competitive practices experienced in the region in recent years, especially in the 
area of acquisitions and fusions and cartels, have increasingly shown a cross-border character. And 
among the countries, there is a common spectrum of the sectors that have been affected by these 
practices (Valdes, 2005). For this reason, the objective of international cooperation in competition 
policy, in particular of its incorporation in FTAs, is that expected benefits of trade and investment 
liberalization are not to be impaired by cross-border anti-competitive practices in an increasingly 
integrated economy. In fact, FTAs have increasingly incorporated disciplines on competition policy 
since the beginning of the 1990s. At the same time, some countries of the region have developed a 
national competition defense mechanism of some sort, despite a marked, persistent heterogeneity 
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among them, in terms of depth, level of development or maturity of their competition systems; 
indeed, some participating countries do not even have competition laws or institutions.43 
Although the WTO does not provide comprehensive norms on competition, the URAs 
contain several provisions in order to ensure authentic competitive conditions in trade. They 
include the provisions on monopoly and exclusive services providers in the GATS, the abuses of 
intellectual property rights or controls on anticompetitive practices in contract licensing in the 
TRIPS, and the provisions of the GATT with respect to antidumping or State enterprises, among 
others. The search for a multilateral agreement on competition policy, an issue systematically 
addressed in the WTO framework since 1997 that originated from the Singapore Ministerial 
mandate, has not produced concrete results up to now, and remains outside the Doha Round 
negotiations at present.44 In this context, RTAs could become a necessary “stepping stone” toward 
reaching an agreement at the multilateral level. As the Secretary-General of UNCTAD in a recent 
publication stated: “A fundamental message to be derived from the empirical findings and policy 
experiences presented in the publication is that competition provisions at the regional levels can act 
as a major complement to the current efforts to develop an open, rule-based, predictable, non-
discriminatory trading system, with a fair distribution of benefits for all developing countries” 
(Brusick et. al., 2005: p.iii). 
The countries in the region, which addressed the issue of competition policy in the FTAA 
framework earlier, have incorporated this policy agenda in inter- and intra-regional bilateral trade 
agreements and/or integration agreements, whose coverage is wider and commitments are deeper.45 
While NAFTA’s orientation is the enforcement of national laws and the strengthening of national 
agencies in charge of competition policy through mutual capacity-building assistance, regional 
integration schemes tend to focus on harmonization or creation of a supra-national institution, as in 
the case of the European Union (Tavares y Tineo, 1999). Although the incorporation of 
competition policy in sub-regional or integration agreements has had some impact to strengthen 
national policies, efforts at the sub-regional level have been held back in recent years. 
For example, MERCOSUR ruled the protocol on competition defense in 2002 (Protocolo de 
Fortaleza de 1996), but this provision has not entered in effect due to the difficulty of being 
legislated into national laws. For this reason, up to now there has been progress only on the 
“Understandings” between competition agencies in this sub-region.46 In the case of CARICOM, the 
Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas of 2001 establishes a far-reaching competition scheme, Chapter 8, 
which requires national regimes in the participating countries in order to strengthen cooperation 
and implementation of this policy, but only two of the member countries are equipped with that 
legislation at present.47 Only the Andean Community of Nations has recently implemented a wide-
raging reform to strengthen the community’s competition regime.48 
In contrast to the meager progress made via the sub-regional routes, a greater advance has 
been made through the competition provision in FTAs and other bilateral cooperation agreements 
such as cooperation agreements between competition agencies. This could help to form and/or 
strengthen the culture of competition in a more general sense (Silva, 2004). Actually, since the mid 
                                                     
43 Only a little more than one-third of the countries of the region have in their disposal comprehensive provisions on competition 
policy (Argentina, Barbados, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Jamaica, México, Panama, Peru, Uruguay 
and Venezuela), and around ten countries are at present formulating or revising respective legislation. 
44  The negotiations in the Doha Round in this area were not included in the WTO’s “July Package” of 2004. 
45 Last version of Agreement Draft – Chapter XIX, November 2003, available at: http://www.ftaa-
alca.org/FTAADraft03/ChapterXIX_e.asp 
46 See the Mercosur site: www.mercosur.org.uy.  
47 The FTAs signed by the countries of this sub-region since 1998 with the Dominican Republic, Cuba and Costa Rica contain 
provisions on competition with a limited scope in terms of cooperation (Stewart, 2005b). 
48 Decree No. 608, March 29, 2005 (available at: http://www.comunidadandina.org/normativa/dec/D608.htm). See García-Gallardo y 
Dominguez, 2005. 
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1990s, some twenty trade agreements with such provisions have been signed, more than half of that 
since 2000, mainly with extra-regional trade partners.49 These agreements have followed diverse 
formats, but can be grouped into basically two patterns, the EU model vs. the NAFTA model (see 
Table 8).50 
Table 8 
DIVERSE FORMATS OF THE COMPETITION POLICY CLAUSE IN FTAS 
NAFTA Model  EU +- Model: 
• Chile with Canada, Central 
America, USA  
• Mexico with Israel, Uruguay, 
• Others: Chile–Mexico, Central 
America-Panama, Panama- Taiwan 
Province of China  
• Chile with: EU, EFTA, 
Rep. Of Korea, P4 
• Mexico with: EFTA, 
EU, Japan 
• Others: Costa Rica-
Canada  
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on  Silva (2004). 
 
 
The EU model, oriented specially toward cooperation, defines explicitly the anti-competitive 
situations to be covered and provides more detailed commitments to be established for one or more 
of the cooperation functions. Normally, such agreements do not include provisions for dispute 
settlement. The NAFTA model, whose main focus is to strengthen legislation and its application, 
has as an objective that monopolies and State enterprises should function in accordance with trade 
considerations (even pricing).51 In order to ensure the fulfillment of this condition, countries are 
expected to establish control or supervision mechanisms. The importance of cooperation and 
coordination is recognized for the application of the laws in the free trade area, but as a whole these 
agreements do not establish clear conditions and procedures on the subject. Thus, more recently, 
the signing of specific cooperation agreements between competition agencies has complemented 
some of these agreements. Finally, almost all agreements do not make it explicit the relationship 
between competition policy and trade remedies such as antidumping rules and countervailing 
duties. 
In the majority of cases, with the exception of NAFTA, a short time elapsed since their 
implementation makes it difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of the agreements. The asymmetries 
involved and the fear of losing autonomy (which limits, for example, the transfer of confidential 
information) magnify, to some extent, the difficulty in coordinating among countries, despite 
greater articulation achieved with respect to national measures (Valdés, 2005). In addition, to 
evaluate the benefits is complex because they are not restricted not only to the estimates on cost 
savings by preventing anticompetitive practices, which is a difficult task in itself, but also the 
general incidence on market efficiency involved. In any case, the agreements influence these 
conditions. On the other hand, the costs associated with implementing and strengthening 
competition policy systems in order to comply with the commitments of the agreements depend on 
the initial conditions of the participating countries and the type of agreement signed. In this respect, 
the discussions and negotiations at broader forums —like OECD and UNCTAD— also contribute 
                                                     
49 Furthermore, while the CAFTA-RD agreement does not include provisions on this respect, the ongoing negotiations of the United 
States with the three Andean Community countries (Colombia, Ecuador and Peru) are reported to include a chapter on competition. 
The ongoing negotiation between the EU and MERCOSUR also include a chapter on this issue. 
50 Other agreements basically establish the concept of strengthening the competition systems of the countries involved (Chile-
MERCOSUR, Central America-Dominican Republic, CARICOM-Costa Rica and other countries cited in Stewart, 2005b). 
51 In a way that they do not minimize the benefits of the agreements, contradict competition laws or grant discriminatory treatment to 
investment. Furthermore, dispute settlement is not normally applied to the fulfilment of domestic laws or policies, as in the case of 
rules relating to monopolies and State enterprises. 
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to capacity-building in countries which are just beginning to develop a competition policy. 
Furthermore, there have also been contributions in terms of concepts and principles from bodies 
such as APEC, FTAA and WTO. 
Nevertheless, it is important to underline that despite the disparity that exists in the region 
surrounding competition policy regimes, those countries with a less developed competition scheme 
do not seem to benefit from any special and differential treatment (SDT). In general, the 
agreements make no reference to exceptions for sensitive sectors. They neither offer longer periods 
to adapt or implement the norms, nor establish commitments to receive technical assistance from 
more developed countries, albeit in practice there exists such a possibility.52 In this respect, 
competition policy incorporated in regional integration schemes could contribute to strengthening 
competition defense mechanisms of the less developed member countries,53 in such a way that 
international cooperation effectively becomes an instrument to address the existing asymmetries in 
the region and to overcome the scale limitations, while facilitating the task of capacity building in 
competition policy. These long-term elements can contribute to moving forward the negotiations at 
the multilateral level as well.  
Finally, despite more research undertaken in recent years,54 there still remains a great need of 
technical work to be done, especially with respect to the relation between specific provisions on 
competition including those on the infrastructure sectors and other provisions within the FTA (e.g., 
services, investment, and trade defense). In the same vein, it is necessary to put in place an 
effective evaluation and improvement mechanism of the agreements in order make those provisions 
more operational, especially in light of the fact that competition policy remains outside the WTO 
negotiation processes. 
 
                                                     
52 See also the articles of Alvarez and other, and Brusick and Clarke in Brusick et. al. (2005).  
53 As in the case of the new CAN norms of 2005 with regard to Bolivia. 
54 Among the most recent works, see Brusick, et. al (2005). 




Given the increasing need for the Latin American and 
Caribbean region to integrate itself into the world economy, the 
possibility of walking away from the rules-based multilateral trading 
system is no longer a valid option for trade strategy. Bilateral and 
regional trading arrangements cannot take the place of multilateral 
rules. As the inconclusive negotiation process of FTAA attests, 
genuine market access and the removal of market distortions in global 
agricultural and other product markets can only be effectively 
addressed and successfully negotiated in WTO. Latin America and the 
Caribbean must remain firm but must also stand ready to negotiate in 
this forum, ideally on the basis of a united stance. The broader and the 
more cohesive the Latin American and Caribbean coalition is, the 
higher the likelihood of achieving more balanced and favorable results 
in these negotiations.  
A Doha Round that includes ambitious agricultural 
liberalization measures would provide the most significant gains to the 
world economy and particularly to the Latin American and Caribbean 
countries, while agricultural negotiations (multilateral, regional or 
bilateral) are of central importance. An ambitious agricultural 
liberalization program should, in turn, allow the Latin American and 
Caribbean countries to offer concessions in other areas and still sign a 
Doha Round agreement that strikes a proper balance of rights and 
obligations and serves the interests of the region. Latin America and 
the Caribbean should ensure that concessions in these sensitive areas 
are supported by adequate safeguard mechanisms.  
For the region, a comprehensive and balanced FTAA might be a 
better option than a complex web of hub-and-spoke BTAs, if  
Bilateralism and Regionalism: Re-establishing the Primacy of Multilateralism a Latin American and Caribbean Perspective 
54 
implemented with care and with effective safeguard and social policies. The challenge for the Latin 
American and Caribbean countries is to find ways to minimize concessions in sensitive sectors and 
maximize those in areas such as market access, movement of workers and technical assistance in 
connection with sanitary and phytosanitary rules. FTAA should be quite ambitious in terms of 
liberalizing market access for goods, especially for agricultural products, but not in respect of non-
border issues. For the western hemisphere, a successful and comprehensive FTAA would enhance 
regional alliances for multilateral negotiations. This calls for generous and visionary leadership, 
with additional concessions from all sides. In short, a Doha Round that includes an ambitious 
agricultural liberalization component promises to deliver the most significant gains among 
alternative scenarios. 
Obviously, certain principles in RTAs are liable to create positive synergies with the 
multilateral system. The first would be for countries to engage only in regional commitments that 
they would be willing to eventually extend to the multilateral setting. This might occur when 
countries concurrently lower MFN tariffs along with preferential rates, thereby reducing the 
likelihood of trade and investment diversion. Countries also should promote the principle of 
transparency by ensuring that comprehensive information on the tariffs, regulations and rules of 
origin of their RTAs is publicly and readily available and that all such RTAs are notified to WTO 
in a timely manner (WTO 2003). On the other hand, WTO rules should provide the limits and 
boundaries for the scope and nature of RTAs. But, first, WTO rules themselves need to be made 
more flexible and development-friendly. In particular, WTO rules should provide sufficient scope 
for addressing the development concerns of its member countries. When such agreements involve 
both developing and developed countries, they should allow for less than full reciprocity in trade 
relations between the two. In addition, RTAs that are or are intended to become “WTO-plus,” 
should be made as WTO-compatible as possible. 
Initiatives to strengthen positive synergies among sub-regional, regional and bilateral 
agreements, as well as plurilateral North-South initiatives, and the advance of the multilateral 
trading system create a heavy institutional and financial burden for the Latin American and 
Caribbean countries. Bilateral agreements between countries or sub-regions could serve as 
“building blocks” when and if the precedents they establish are consistent with a comprehensive, 
balanced FTAA or WTO that takes due account of the smaller economies’ vulnerabilities. This is 
also true in cases where the commitments made in certain disciplines included in bilateral and sub-
regional agreements facilitate the adoption of multilateral rules in the same disciplines. Otherwise, 
bilateral agreements could impede the construction of a development-oriented FTAA or WTO, 
leaving the region with too extensive a web of hub-and-spoke agreements, with high associated 
costs of administration, transparency and efficiency. 
Although regional integration has suffered a number of setbacks in the course of its 
consolidation process in recent years, there is a wide recognition among government officials that a 
revitalized and thriving regional integration process is a prerequisite for raising international 
competitiveness and achieving greater economic and social stability. It is also recognized that, in 
order for regional integration to play such a role, several dimensions of “deep integration” will 
need to be tackled within a context of “Open Regionalism”. This means going far beyond 
conventional arrangements concerning trade in goods and moving forward with the liberalization of 
trade in services and investment and of factor movements, harmonizing regulatory regimes and 
environmental and labor standards, and regulating private anti-competitive practices. In addition, 
this approach to integration requires the adoption of agreements that will contribute to 
macroeconomic stability in each country and its harmonization among countries, suitable 
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technological infrastructure, the modernization and construction of infrastructure in such areas as 
transport, communications, and ports, and the establishment of trade-promotion mechanisms.55  
Over the years, ECLAC has argued that to ensure their development, countries generally 
must hold onto some flexibility in stimulating productive development, boosting competitiveness 
and managing their capital account as a tool of macroeconomic regulation. Moreover, to ensure that 
participating countries’ levels of development eventually converge, new initiatives are vital, among 
them the creation of cohesion or integration funds56 and increasing international labor mobility 
(Assael 2004, Bustillo and Ocampo 2003). With respect to FTAA, as outlined in the Hemispheric 
Cooperation Program that was endorsed by trade ministers attending the meeting held in Quito, 
Ecuador, on 1 November 2002,57 the technical cooperation made available will be of fundamental 
importance in ensuring that FTAA brings benefits to its members. This should not be limited to 
providing technical assistance, but should also include strengthening production capacity and 
stimulating competitiveness, innovation and technology transfers.  
Special care should be taken to ensure that the countries participating in North-South BTAs 
are not subjected to onerous “WTO-plus” obligations and are accorded SDT (as they should be in 
WTO), as well as being provided with adequate financial and technical assistance to undertake any 
necessary adjustments. Technical assistance and capacity building programs focused on 
enhancement of international competitiveness of the productive sectors should be increasingly 
taken into account in the negotiation/implementation/administration process of North-South BTAs. 
With respect to SDT, traditional means of developmental flexibility, such as transition periods and 
permitted derogations, need to be combined with special considerations and meaningful 
preferential treatment by developed countries, not only in the area of trade in goods but also in 
other negotiation areas, such as services, investment and competition policy (Silva 2003). How to 
conceive SDT in areas other than goods is a complex task, and more analytical work should be 
undertaken to supports the countries of the region on policy options on these issues. 
A large constraint on developing countries’ efforts to build value-added industrial production 
capabilities is the instability and long-term negative trend in primary commodity prices. In this 
respect, multilateral price support mechanisms for the major primary commodities could greatly 
enhance developing countries’ ability to capture greater gains from commodity trade, a topic that 
has been addressed in the Working Group on Trade, Debt and Finance. In this respect, attention 
should be given to the provision of assistance to: (i) mitigate the consequences of temporary 
earnings shortfalls by means of such mechanisms as IMF facilities and market-based instruments; 
and (ii) promote diversification programs. It might also be desirable to create one or more kinds of 
regional schemes to deal with sharp downturns in capital flows or the terms of trade as a 
complement to, rather than a substitute for, the facilities offered by the International Monetary 
Fund (Machinea 2003a, 2003b). 
                                                     
55 Regional cooperation efforts on infrastructure, such as the Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America 
(IIRSA) and the Puebla-Panama Plan (PPP), have high priority in this respect. 
56 With respect to FTAA on this issue, in the Third Summit of the Americas (April 2001, Canada), various leaders called for the 
creation of different funds for social cohesion or integration that would allow greater support to be provided for the hemispheric 
agreement. In that meeting, the President of Mexico referred to a cohesion fund, while the prime ministers of various Caribbean 
countries highlighted the importance of funds for integration. The Government of Ecuador, which was in charge of coordinating 
negotiations until November 2002, later proposed the creation of a fund for the promotion of competitiveness (Assael 2004). 
Venezuela has put forward a number of proposals regarding the issue of structural convergence funds (see FTAA.TNC/w/242, 16 
February 2004 on the FTAA website). 
57 In support of FTAA, the trade ministers instructed the TNC in November 2002, with the support of the Consultative Group on 
Smaller Economies (CGSE) and the Tripartite Committee, to create the Hemispheric Cooperation Program (HCP). “The Program is 
intended to strengthen the capacities of those countries seeking assistance to participate in the negotiations, implement their trade 
commitments, and address the challenges and maximize the benefits of hemispheric integration, including productive capacity and 
competitiveness in the region.” “The Program includes a mechanism to assist these countries to develop national and/or sub-regional 
trade capacity building strategies that define, prioritize and articulate their needs and programs pursuant to those strategies, and to 
identify sources of financial and non-financial support.” (Ministerial Declaration in Quito, 2002, paragraph 18, www.ftaa-acla.org). 
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